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A B S T R A C T
The thesis contains three essays on the determinants of productiv-
ity. The first essay studies how costly supplier contract enforcement
shapes firm boundaries, and quantifies the impact of this transaction
cost on aggregate productivity and welfare. Contract enforcement
costs lead suppliers to underproduce. Thus, firms will perform more
of the production process in-house instead of outsourcing it. In coun-
tries with slow and costly courts, firms should buy relatively less
inputs from sectors whose products are more specific to the buyer-
seller relationship. I first present reduced-form evidence for this hy-
pothesis using cross-country regressions. I use microdata on case law
from the United States to construct a new measure of relationship-
specificity by sector-pairs. This allows me to control for productivity
differences across countries and sectors and to causally identify the
effect of contracting frictions on industry structure. I estimate a model
and conduct a series of counterfactual experiments. Setting enforce-
ment costs to US levels would increase real income by an average of
3.6 percent across all countries, and by an average of 10 percent across
low-income countries.
The second essay investigates the role of bureaucratic startup costs
and credit market imperfections in shaping selection, misallocation,
and aggregate productivity. We study a dynamic model of misalloca-
tion. Limited access to external financing and entry costs mean that
firms are not necessarily operated by the most talented managers. We
calibrate our model to the United States. Our findings suggest that the
reduction of startup costs would only have a small impact on aggre-
gate productivity and welfare. Financial frictions, on the other hand,
seem to have a much larger impact.
The third essay returns to the role of intermediate inputs for eco-
nomic performance. Using panel data on manufacturing firms in
India, we study the role of input complementarities in shaping the
firm’s choice of products. We find that firms are more likely to add
products to their portfolio if these products require intermediate in-
puts that the firm is already using in their production activities. Our
findings shed light on the source of firm’s core competencies. We also
provide the first study of supply linkages within multiproduct firms
in developing countries. We find product turnover rates in India that
are comparable to US levels.
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Part I
I N S T I T U T I O N S A N D E C O N O M I C
P E R F O R M A N C E
1
T H E I M PA C T O F C O N T R A C T E N F O R C E M E N T
C O S T S O N O U T S O U R C I N G A N D A G G R E G AT E
P R O D U C T I V I T Y
“A good deal of literature on transaction costs takes en-
forcement as a given, assuming either that it is perfect or
that it is constantly imperfect. In fact, enforcement is sel-
dom either, and the structure of enforcement mechanisms
and the frequency and severity of imperfection play a ma-
jor role in the costs of transacting and in the forms that
contracts take.”
— Douglass C. North, (North, 1990)
1.1 introduction
A prominent and growing literature has established that legal insti-
tutions matter for economic development. Most of this literature has
either studied these mechanisms at the microeconomic level, or docu-
mented their macroeconomic relevance via reduced-form regressions
at the industry or country level.1 Despite their contributions, this lit-
erature has not resolved a central question: just how important are
legal institutions for aggregate outcomes?
In this paper, I am concerned with one particular dimension of
legal institutions: the cost of enforcing a supplier contract in court.
Countries differ vastly in the speed and cost of enforcement pro-
cedures: while Icelandic courts often resolve commercial disputes
within a few months, cases in India that are decades old are com-
monplace.2 This constitutes a transaction cost between firms (North,
1990). If enforcement of supplier contracts is costly, firms will per-
form a larger part of the production process within the firm, instead
of outsourcing it, thereby avoiding having to contract with an external
supplier. This increases the cost of production (Khanna and Palepu,
2000).3,4 Higher production cost feeds into higher input prices in
1 See, among others, Besley and Ghatak (2010) on the microeconomic level, and La
Porta et al. (1997), Djankov et al. (2003), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), and many
papers that follow Rajan and Zingales (1998).
2 Council of Europe (2005), Supreme Court of India (2009)
3 In a case study on the TV broadcasting industry in India, Anand and Khanna (2003)
give the example of the cable network firm Zee Telefilms Limited (ZTL), which was
faced with a multitude of local cable operator firms that grossly understated the
number of subscribers and underpaid fees. Litigation was slow and costly, thus ZTL
was forced to expand into the cable operator’s business. The resulting distribution
subsidiary was not profitable for the first five years after its inception, a long time in
an industry that consisted mostly of small young firms.
4 See also the surveys by Bresnahan and Levin (2013), and Syverson (2011).
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downstream sectors, thus amplifying the distortions on the macroe-
conomic scale.5
This paper exploits cross-country variation in enforcement costs
and input expenditure shares to study the importance of enforcement
costs for productivity and income per capita. I make three contribu-
tions to our understanding of the role of institutions for economic
outcomes. First, I construct a general-equilibrium model that reveals
how contract enforcement costs, together with asset specificity, shape
the firm’s domestic outsourcing decision and the economy’s indus-
try structure. To describe contracting frictions, I extend the literature
on hold-up in a bilateral buyer-seller relationship to a setting of en-
forceable contracts, where enforcement is subject to a cost and goods
are relationship-specific. Contracts may alleviate hold-up problems
only if enforcement costs are sufficiently low. Second, I find evidence
for my model’s qualitative predictions on external input use using
cross-country reduced-form regressions. Using microdata on case law
from the United States I construct a new measure of relationship-
specificity. By counting the number of court cases between two sec-
tors, and normalizing it, I obtain the relative prevalence of litigation
between these two sectors, which is informative about the degree of
relationship-specificity. The fact that this is a bilateral measure means
that I can control for cross-country heterogeneity in the upstream
sectors, and causally identify the effect of costly enforcement on out-
sourcing. Third, I show that this has large consequences for aggre-
gate productivity and welfare. I do this by structurally estimating my
model and simulating the aggregate variables in the absence of en-
forcement costs. Hence, transaction costs and the boundaries of the
firm are issues of macroeconomic importance.
The analysis proceeds in several steps. I first propose a general-
equilibrium model where firms face a binary decision between in-
house production and domestic outsourcing for each activity in the
production process.6 Firms and suppliers draw independent produc-
tivity realizations for each activity. In-house production uses labor,
which is provided on a frictionless market. Outsourcing, however,
is subject to contracting frictions that increase its effective cost. To
understand what drives the magnitude of the distortion I explicitly
model the interaction of the buyer and seller. The produced goods
are relationship-specific, i.e. they are worth more within the buyer-
seller relationship than to an outside party. Contracts specify a quan-
tity to be delivered and a fee, and are enforceable at a cost which is
proportional to the value of the claim.7 Courts do not enforce penal
clauses in the contract, and award damages only to compensate the
innocent party. This places strong limitations on the ability to punish
the underperforming party, and may give rise to the seller breaching
5 This idea of a ’multiplier effect’ goes back to Hirschman (1958). See also Ciccone
(2002), Jones (2011a, 2011b), and Acemoglu et al. (2012).
6 I use the term ’activity’ to refer to both physical inputs and tasks in the production
process.
7 Enforcement costs include time costs, court fees, and fees for legal representation
and expert witnesses.
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the contract in equilibrium. When the buyer holds up the seller, the
seller could recover his fee net of damages by going to court. In the
presence of enforcement costs, the amount the seller could recover is
lower, leading him to ex-ante produce less than the efficient quantity.
On the other hand, if enforcement costs are high and the resulting
inefficiency is large, it may be preferable to write an unenforceable
(incomplete) contract, where the inefficiency depends on the degree
of relationship-specificity (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1979). This
can be replicated through an enforceable contract where the specified
quantity is zero.8 Thus, the overall distortion when using an optimal
contract is the minimum of the distortions implied by enforcement
costs (in the case of a formal contract, and breach) and relationship-
specificity (in the case of an informal contract).
Next, I provide empirical evidence for my model’s key qualitative
prediction using cross-country reduced-form regressions. The model
predicts that in countries where enforcement costs are high, firms
spend less on inputs that are very relationship-specific. I thus regress
intermediate input expenditure shares by sector-pair on an interac-
tion of country-wide enforcement costs and relationship-specificity
at the sector-pair level. Regarding relationship-specificity, I exploit
my contracting game’s prediction that high relationship-specificity is
linked to higher prevalence of breach on behalf of the seller. Using
case law from the United States for 1990-2012, I construct a measure
of relationship-specificity of an upstream-downstream sector pair that
is the number of court cases with a firm from the upstream sector, per
firm in the downstream sector. On the sector-pair-country level this
measure, interacted with enforcement costs in the country, is neg-
atively correlated with the downstream sector’s expenditure share
on inputs from the upstream sector: in countries with high enforce-
ment costs, intermediate input shares are lower for sector-pairs where
litigation is common in the United States. Since this relationship-
specificity measure varies across sector-pairs, I can include country-
upstream sector fixed effects and thus control for unobserved hetero-
geneity, such as differences in productivity and access to external fi-
nancing, across sectors and countries. To the extent of my knowledge,
my paper is the first to use this identification strategy in cross-country
regressions. 9
Finally, I quantify the impact of enforcement costs on aggregate
variables by structurally estimating the key parameters of my model
and performing a set of counterfactual exercises. This is possible be-
cause my model exploits the tractability of multi-country Ricardian
trade models, most notably the one of Eaton and Kortum (2002), even
though these papers study an entirely different question. I obtain a
relatively simple expression for intermediate input use between sec-
8 My model thus provides a new economic rationale for preferring informal contracts
over formal ones, where the threat of litigation and its associated costs may lead the
seller to ex-ante underinvest.
9 Existing industry-level measures of relationship-specificity (Nunn 2007, Levchenko
2007, Bernard et al. 2010) are constructed using data on input-output relationships,
which are endogenous in my analysis, and/or are only available for physical goods.
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tors, where contracting frictions distort input prices and lower inter-
mediate input expenditure shares in the same way iceberg trade costs
lower trade shares in the Eaton-Kortum model. I structurally estimate
the key elasticities, along with country-specific parameters such as
sectoral productivity levels, from data on intermediate input shares
and enforcement costs. This allows me to perform welfare counter-
factuals, and highlight the macroeconomic significance of transaction
costs: reducing enforcement costs to zero would increase real income
per capita by an average of 7 percent across all countries (13.3 percent
across low-income countries), and decrease consumer prices by an av-
erage of 8.5 percent. For countries with very high enforcement costs,
such as Indonesia, Mozambique, and Cambodia, the welfare benefits
would be around 30 to 50 percent of real income. For many countries
the welfare impact exceeds the gains from international trade that the
literature has estimated. Since zero enforcement costs may be impos-
sible to achieve in practice, I also calculate the counterfactual welfare
gains when enforcement costs are set to US levels. The corresponding
increase in real income would still be on average 3.6 percent across
all countries, and on average 10 percent across low-income countries.
The paper contributes to the literature on legal institutions and
their macroeconomic effects.10 The challenges in this literature are
twofold. First, institutions are hard to quantify. I therefore guide my
empirical analysis using a micro-founded model. The empirical coun-
terpart for the enforcement cost maps exactly into the theoretical con-
cept. Second, it is hard to empirically identify the effect of institu-
tions on macro-outcomes due to the presence of many unobserved
factors that correlate with institutions and development. The litera-
ture on cross-country regressions in macroeconomics typically deals
with this by trying to proxy for these unobserved factors. This in-
troduces measurement error and other problems. By exploiting varia-
tion across countries and sector-pairs, I can include country-upstream-
sector fixed effects and thus control for unobserved heterogeneity in
country-industry pairs in a much cleaner way.
The paper is also related to the literature on the role of intermedi-
ate inputs for aggregate outcomes.11 These papers typically take the
country’s input-output structure as exogenous, or even take the US
input-output table to describe the industry structure across countries.
I show that input-output tables differ substantially and systematically
across countries and exploit this variation in my empirical analysis. In
10 For example, theoretical work by Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2007) studies the
effects of contracting frictions on the incentives to invest in technology. The empirical
literature often employs reduced-form cross-country regressions, see Rajan and Zin-
gales (1998), La Porta et al. (1998), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), and many others.
Recent country studies include Laeven and Woodruff (2007) and Chemin (2010) on
judicial efficiency in Mexico and, respectively, India; Ponticelli (2013) on bankruptcy
reform in Brazil, and Cole, Greenwood, and Sanchez (2012) on courts and technology
adoption in Mexico.
11 Among others, Hirschman (1958), Romer (1980), and Jones (2011a, 2011b) for eco-
nomic growth, and Dupor (1999), Horvath (2000), Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Car-
valho and Gabaix (2013) for fluctuations. See also Oberfield (2013) for how input
linkages shape aggregate productivity.
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the model I endogenize the sectoral composition of the firm’s input
baskets.
My paper also draws on the literature on contracting frictions, in-
termediate inputs, and productivity in international trade.12 While
my analysis is only concerned with domestic transactions, there are
reasons to believe that this still captures most of the welfare effects.
Contracting frictions are particularly important for service inputs, be-
cause these are naturally relationship-specific (i.e., once produced
they cannot be ’sold’ to an outside party). Services are typically per-
formed within the boundaries of the economy. Furthermore, any dis-
tortion to international trade due to contracting frictions cannot cause
a welfare loss greater than the overall gains from trade, thus I capture
the bulk of the relevant distortions.13
Finally, viewed through the lens of industrial organization, my pa-
per is related to the theoretical and empirical literature on transaction
costs and vertical integration. In my theory, the firm’s make-or-buy
decision is influenced both by the presence of non-transferable firm-
specific capabilities (Wernerfelt, 1984; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007),
and by its desire to overcome transaction costs (Klein, Crawford and
Alchian, 1979; Williamson, 1985). In modeling transaction costs and
property rights, I deviate from the usual assumption of incomplete
contracts and instead assume that contracts are enforceable at a cost,
and that courts award expectation damages.14 The property rights
are then endogenously assigned by an optimal contract, taking into
account enforcement costs and relationship-specificity, to maximize
the ex-ante investment. The strength of this approach is that there is
a direct empirical counterpart for the transaction cost, which allows
me to study its quantitative importance.15 The paper also contributes
to the empirical literature on the determinants of the boundaries of
the firm.16
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes a macromodel
of input choice, where contracting frictions distort the firm’s make-or-
12 Antràs (2003) pioneered the property rights approach in international trade. Khan-
delwal and Topalova (2011) show that increased access to intermediate inputs in-
creases firm productivity. Nunn (2007) uses cross-country regressions to show that
contracting institutions shape comparative advantage and explains this using a story
similar to mine. Compared to his work, I show direct evidence on input use and
study the quantitative effects of contracting institutions. To keep my model suffi-
ciently tractable to allow estimation of the parameters, I draw from the literature on
quantitative trade models, see Eaton and Kortum (2002), Chor (2010), Costinot, Don-
aldson, and Komunjer (2012), Caliendo and Parro (2012), and Arkolakis, Costinot,
and Rodriguez-Clare (2012).
13 Indeed, Irarrazabal et al. (2013) argue that exporting and multinational production
are close substitutes. Garetto (2013) estimates that the gains from intra-firm interna-
tional trade are roughly 0.23 percent of consumption per capita. For more complex
sourcing strategies, see Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2013).
14 The literature in Law and Economics discusses the economics of enforcement costs
and remedies for breach. See Hermalin et al. (2007) for a survey. Shavell (1980) and
Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), among others, discuss the role of expectation damages
for relationship-specific investment.
15 Grossman and Helpman (2002) study the vertical integration decision in general
equilibrium using incomplete contracts and search frictions as transaction costs.
Their focus is entirely on qualitative predictions.
16 See Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for a survey.
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buy decision. Section 1.3 qualitatively assesses the model’s key predic-
tion using cross-country reduced-form regressions. Section 1.4 struc-
turally estimates the model of section 1.2, and evaluates the produc-
tivity and welfare implications of costly contract enforcement. Section
1.5 concludes.
1.2 a macroeconomic model of input sourcing
This section presents a macroeconomic model where firms face the
decision between producing in-house and outsourcing. The model
economy is closed. Outsourcing is subject to frictions due to the pres-
ence of contract enforcement costs. These frictions distort the relative
price of outsourcing, and thus lead to over-use of in-house produc-
tion. I first discuss the firm’s production functions, and then turn to
the modes of sourcing. I pay particular attention to the contracting
game that is played in the case of outsourcing, explaining how and
when enforcement costs matter, and derive an expression for the mag-
nitude of price distortions. Finally, I put the model into general equi-
librium by adding households, and derive predictions for aggregate
input use.
Methodologically, the model exploits the tractability of the Eaton
and Kortum (2002) approach to modeling discrete sourcing decisions,
albeit for a very different purpose. I model the firm’s binary deci-
sion to outsource in the same way as Eaton and Kortum model the
decision which country to buy from. The contracting frictions in my
model, for which I provide a microfoundation, enter the expression
for intermediate input shares in the same way that iceberg trade costs
enter the expression for trade shares in Eaton-Kortum. This allows me
to model both frictions and input-output linkages between sectors in
a tractable way, and it simplifies the structural estimation and evalu-
ation of the welfare effects.
1.2.1 Technology
There are N sectors in the economy, each consisting of a mass of
perfectly competitive and homogeneous firms. Sector n firms convert
activities {(qni(j), j ∈ [0, 1]}i=1,...,N into output yn according to the
production function17
yn =
 N∑
i=1
γ
1/ρ
ni
(∫1
0
qni(j)
(σn−1)/σndj
) σn
σn−1
ρ−1
ρ
ρ/(ρ−1) , n = 1, . . . ,N.
(1)
17 This is a model where every sector buys from every other sector, but apart from
parameters, they are all ex-ante identical. In a bilateral trade between two sectors,
I always denote the downstream (buying) sector by n and the upstream (selling)
sector by i.
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The sets {(n, i, j), j ∈ [0, 1]}i=1,...,N are the sets of inputs that sector n
may source from a firm belonging to sector i, or, alternatively, pro-
duce itself using labor. The index j denotes the individual activities/-
varieties within each basket. As an example, consider a car manufac-
turing plant. Then, n = car and i ∈ {metal, electricity, R&D, . . . } are
the different broad sets of activities, corresponding to the different
upstream (roughly 2-digit) sectors, that need to be performed during
the production process. The index j corresponds to the individual va-
rieties of inputs (in the case of physical inputs) or tasks (in the case of
intangible inputs). The firm faces the outsourcing decision for every j:
a manufacturing plant may want to contract with an accounting firm
to do the accounting for them, or decide to employ an accountant
themselves, perhaps at a higher cost. In this case, the activity j would
be ’accounting’, and the upstream industry i would be the business
services sector. The technological parameters γni capture how much
the broad set of inputs i are actually needed in the production pro-
cess of sector n: the γcars,steel will be high, whereas γcars,agriculture will
be low.
For each activity (n, i, j), the sector n firms have to decide whether
to produce the activity themselves, or to outsource it. I model the
boundaries of firms to be determined primarily by their capabili-
ties.18 Both the downstream firm and the potential suppliers draw an
activity-specific productivity realization, which determine the cost of
each option. The downstream firm decides on whether to outsource
by comparing them. Outsourcing, however, is subject to contracting
frictions, which increase its cost and thus lead to too much in-house
production compared to a frictionless world. In order to keep the
firm’s decision problem tractable, I model outsourcing as buying ac-
tivity (n, i, j) from a sector i firm via an intermediary. Once the de-
cision has been taken, it is irreversible.19 I discuss each of the two
options in turn.
1.2.1.1 In-house Production
The sector n firm can produce activity (n, i, j) itself by employing la-
bor. One unit of labor generates sni(j) units of activity (n, i, j), thus
the production function is qni(j) = sni(j)l(n, i, j), where l(n, i, j) is
labor used and sni(j) is a stochastic productivity realization that fol-
lows a Fréchet distribution,
P(sni(j) < z) = e
−Snz
−θ
.
I assume that the sni(j) are i.i.d. across i, j, and n. The parameter
Sn captures the overall productivity of sector n firms: higher Sn will,
on average, lead to higher realizations of the productivity parameters
sni(j). The parameter θ is inversely related to the variance of the
distribution. The labor market is perfectly competitive. Denote the
18 This can be motivated by managers having a limited span of control (Lucas, 1978),
or that there are resources that cannot be transferred across firms (Wernerfelt, 1984).
19 This eliminates competition between the potential employees and the suppliers.
Bernard et al. (2003) relax this assumption to obtain variable markups.
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wage by w, and the cost of one unit of activity (n, i, j) conditional on
in-house production by plni(j). Then,
plni(j) =
w
sni(j)
. (2)
1.2.1.2 Arm’s Length Transaction
In case of outsourcing, the sector n firms post their demand function
to an intermediary. There is one intermediary per activity. In turn,
the intermediary sources the goods from a sector i firm (’supplier’),
who tailors the goods to the relationship. The intermediary then sells
the goods on to the downstream sector firm, earning revenue R(·), as
given by the downstream firm’s demand function.
When dealing with the supplier, the intermediary chooses a con-
tract that maximizes its profit subject to participation by a supplier
firm. The supplier’s outside option is zero. I will show that the chosen
contract pushes the supplier down to its outside option, which means
that this is also the contract that the social planner would choose if
he wanted to maximize the overall surplus (conditional on the fric-
tions). One supplier is chosen at random, and the intermediary and
the supplier are locked into a bilateral relationship.
Suppliers can transform one unit of sector i output (produced using
the production function (1)) into zni(j) units of variety (n, i, j), thus
the production function is qni(j) = zni(j)yi(n, i, j), with yi(n, i, j)
being the amount of sector i goods used as inputs.20 Again I assume
that zni(j) follows a Fréchet distribution,
P(zni(j) < z) = e
−Tiz
−θ
and i.i.d. across i, j, and n. The average productivity realization is in-
creasing in the parameter Ti, which captures the upstream sector’s
overall capabilities (productivity, endowments, etc.). The supplier’s
cost of producing one unit of variety (n, i, j) is then cni(j) = pi/zni(j),
where pi is the price index of sector i’s output good, (1). The produc-
tion of the variety is partially reversible: by reverting, the supplier can
get a fraction ωni 6 1 of its production cost back by selling it on the
Walrasian market for the sector i good. This is meant to capture the
degree of relationship-specificity of the variety: if ωni = 1, the vari-
ety is not tailored to the relationship at all, whereas ωni = 0 means
that the good is worthless outside the relationship. All parameters, in-
cluding the productivity realizations zni(j), are common knowledge.
I drop subscripts (n, i, j) for the remainder of the contracting game to
simplify the notation.
The description of the contracting game proceeds as follows. I first
describe the contracting space, and discuss the timing of events and
20 The assumption that variety (n, i, j) is produced using sector i goods in the case of
outsourcing simply means that some of the supplier’s production process may be
outsourced as well. Ultimately, the whole production process is done using labor
and a constant returns to scale production technology; the distinction between labor
and intermediate inputs simply draws the firm boundaries and allows for better
comparison with the data.
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Figure 1: Timeline of the contracting game
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the enforcement mechanism. I then solve the contracting game. Go-
ing back in time, I describe the problem of finding an optimal contract
and characterize the equilibrium thereunder. I then return to the im-
plications for input prices under arm’s length transaction.
The contract The contract between intermediary and supplier is a
pair (q∗,M(·)), where q∗ > 0 is the quantity of the good to be de-
livered21, and M : [0,q∗] → R\R− is a nonnegative, increasing real-
valued function that represents the stipulated payment to the supplier.
M(q∗) is the agreed fee. If M(q) < M(q∗) for q < q∗, this represents
damage payments that are agreed upon at the time of the formation
of the contract, for enforcement in case of a breach of contract (“liq-
uidated damages”).22 I will explain the exact enforcement procedure
after stating the timing of events.
Timing of events
1. The intermediary and the supplier sign a contract (M(q),q∗)
which maximizes the intermediary’s payoff, subject to the sup-
plier’s payoff being nonnegative. At this point the intermediary
cannot perfectly commit to paying M(q) once production has
taken place, other than through the enforcement mechanism ex-
plained below.
2. The supplier produces q units. He chooses q optimally to max-
imize his profits. I assume that if q < q∗, he delivers all the
produced units; if q > q∗, he delivers q∗ and retains control of
the remaining units.23 A unit that has been delivered is under
the control of the intermediary.
21 The supplier’s chosen quantity q may likewise be interpreted as quality of the prod-
uct, or effort. The legal literature calls this relationship-specific investment reliance
(Hermalin et al., 2007).
22 Most jurisdictions impose strong limits on punishment under these clauses. In En-
glish law, in terrorem clauses in contracts are not enforced (Treitel, 1987, Chapter 20).
German and French courts, following the Roman tradition of literal enforcement of
stipulationes poenae, generally recognize penal clauses in contracts, but will, upon ap-
plication, reduce the penalty to a ’reasonable’ amount (BGB § 343, resp. art. 1152
& 1231, code civil, and Zimmermann, 1996, Chapter 4). Given my assumptions on
the courts awarding expectation damages (see below), any restrictions on M are not
going to matter.
23 A.2.1 considers an extension where the supplier decides about how much to deliver.
The equilibrium production (and therefore inefficiency) under an optimal contract
remains the same as in the model from the main text. See also Edlin and Reichelstein
(1996).
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3. The intermediary decides whether or not to hold up the sup-
plier by refusing to pay M(q).
4. If the contract has been breached (either because q < q∗ or be-
cause the intermediary did not pay the fee M(q)), either party
could enforce the contract in a court. The outcome of enforce-
ment is deterministic, and enforcement is costly. Hence, the two
parties avoid this ex-post efficiency loss by settling out of court.
They split the surplus using the symmetric Nash sharing rule,
whereby each party receives the payoff under the outside op-
tion (i.e. the payoff under enforcement), plus half of what would
have been lost to them in the case of enforcement (the enforce-
ment costs). I explain the payoffs under enforcement below.
5. In case the supplier has retained control over some of the pro-
duced units, q − q∗, the two parties may bargain over them.
Again I assume that they split the surplus according to the sym-
metric Nash sharing rule. Since there is no contract to govern
the sale of these goods, the outside option is given by the sup-
plier’s option to revert the production process.
6. The intermediary sells the goods on to the downstream firm,
receiving revenue R(q).
Enforcement After the intermediary’s decision whether or not to
hold up the supplier, either party may feel that they have been harmed
by the other party’s actions: the supplier may have produced less
than what was specified (q < q∗), and the intermediary may have
withheld the fee M(q). Either party may enforce the contract in the
court. The court perfectly observes all actions by both parties, and
awards expectation damages as a remedy. The basic principle to govern
the measurement of these damages is that an injured party is enti-
tled to be put “in as good a position as one would have been in had
the contract been performed” (Farnsworth (2004), §12.8). The precise
interpretation of this rule is as follows:
• If the supplier has breached the contract, q < q∗, he has to pay
the intermediary the difference between the intermediary’s pay-
off under fulfillment, R(q∗) −M(q∗), and under breach, R(q) −
M(q). Hence, he has to pay
D(q,q∗) = R(q∗) −M(q∗) − (R(q) −M(q)) .
• In addition, if the intermediary has not paid the fee M(q), the
court orders him to do so.
It is important to stress that the resulting net transfer may go in either
direction, depending on whether or not the parties are in breach, and
on the relative magnitude of M(q) and D(q,q∗).
I assume furthermore that the plaintiff has to pay enforcement
costs, which amount to a fraction δ of the value of the claim to him.
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The value of the claim is the net transfer to him that would arise
under enforcement.24 These costs include court fees, fees for legal
representation and expert witnesses, and the time cost. The assump-
tion that enforcement costs are increasing in the value of the claim
is in line with empirical evidence (Lee and Willging, 2010), and also
strengthens the link between the model and the empirical analysis
in Section 1.3: my data for enforcement costs are given as a fraction
of the value of the claim.25 In line with the situation in the United
States, I assume that enforcement costs cannot be recovered in court
(Farnsworth, 2004, §12.8).26
Solving for the equilibrium of the contracting game I solve for a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium, which, for a given contract, consists of the
supplier’s production choice qs and the intermediary’s holdup de-
cision, as a function of q. The holdup decision function gives the
intermediary’s optimal response to a produced quantity q, and the
optimal production choice qs is then the supplier’s optimal quantity
q, taking the holdup decision function as given. The full solution of
the game is in A.1. Here, I discuss the intuition for the optimal re-
sponses and the payoff functions.
Case 1: Seller breaches the contract. Consider first the case where
the supplier decides to breach, q < q∗. The intermediary refuses to
pay M(q), in order to shift the burden of enforcement (and thus the
enforcement costs) on the supplier. Hence, in the case of enforcement,
the supplier would receive a net transfer of M(q) −D(q,q∗). This
transfer is positive: if it was negative, the supplier’s overall payoff
would be negative and he would not have accepted the contract in
the first place. Thus, under enforcement, the supplier would be the
plaintiff and would have to pay the enforcement costs. To avoid the
efficiency loss, the two parties bargain over the surplus and settle
outside of court. Under the symmetric Nash sharing rule each party
receives its outside option (the payoff under enforcement) plus one
half of the quasi-rents (the enforcement costs). Thus, the supplier’s
overall payoff under breach is
pis (q,M,q∗) = (1− δ) (M(q) −D(q,q∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
payoff under enforcement
+
1
2
δ (M(q) −D(q,q∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
quasi-rents
− qcni(j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
production cost
24 If the net transfer is negative, he would not have chosen to enforce in the first place.
However, the other party would then have had an incentive to enforce, and would
have been the plaintiff. I show later that in equilibrium the plaintiff is always the
supplier.
25 Having the cost of enforcement in proportion to the value of the claim may also be
seen as a desirable, to align the incentives of the plaintiff’s attorney with those of the
plaintiff. Following the report on civil litigation costs in England and Wales by Lord
Justice Jackson (Jackson, 2009b), the UK government passed reforms to bring costs
more in line with the value of the claims.
26 Many countries have the enforcement costs paid by the losing party (’cost shifting’).
See Jackson (2009a) for a comparative analysis. While cost shifting may mean that in
some circumstances punishment would be possible and therefore higher quantities
could be implemented, the resulting model does not allow for closed-form solutions.
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(3)
if q < q∗. Since D(q,q∗) = R(q∗) −M(q∗) − (R(q) −M(q)), the above
simplifies to
pis (q,M,q∗) =
(
1−
1
2
δ
)
(R(q) − R(q∗) +M(q∗))−qcni(j) if q < q∗.
(4)
Note that the intermediary’s revenue function R appears in the sup-
plier’s payoff function. This is due to the courts awarding expectation
damages: the fact that damage payments are assessed to compensate
the intermediary for forgone revenue means that the supplier inter-
nalizes the payoff to the intermediary. The enforcement costs δ gov-
ern the supplier’s outside option, and hence the settlement: higher
enforcement costs means that the supplier can recover a smaller frac-
tion of his fee net of damages; therefore, the terms of the settlement
are worse for him. Note also that the contract (q∗,M) enters (4) only
through q∗ and M(q∗), and only in an additive manner. This is be-
cause the court awards damages such that the sum of liquidated dam-
ages and expectation damages exactly compensates the intermedi-
ary.27
Case 2: Seller fulfills the contract. Consider next the case where
the supplier fulfills his part of the contract, q > q∗. He delivers
q∗ units to the intermediary, and keeps the remaining units to him-
self. As in the case above, the intermediary refuses to pay the fee
M(q∗): subsequent enforcement of the contract would leave the seller
with a payoff of only (1− δ)M(q∗); hence, under the settlement with
the symmetric Nash solution, the intermediary only has to pay (1−
1
2δ)M(q
∗). After the settlement of the contract, the two parties may
bargain over the remaining q−q∗ units. The Nash sharing rule leaves
the supplier with its outside option (what he would get by reversing
the production process for the q−q∗ units) plus one half of the quasi-
rents. Thus, the supplier’s overall profits are
pis (q,M,q∗) =
(
1−
1
2
δ
)
M(q∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
contract payoff
+ωnicni(j) (q− q
∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
payoff under reverting
+ (5)
+
1
2
(R(q) − R(q∗) −ωnicni(j) (q− q∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
quasi-rents
− qcni(j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
production cost
if q > q∗. Hence, even in the case where the supplier fulfills his
part of the contract, the contract (q∗,M) only enters additively in
the supplier’s payoff function. The terms of the bargaining that gov-
erns the marginal return on production are now given by the degree
27 This point was first made by Shavell (1980), who argued that when courts assign
expectation damages, the parties may achieve first-best even if the contractually
specified payoff is not state-contingent. Similarly, I argue here that under expecta-
tion damages the state-contingent payoffs do not matter, and later show that the
presence of proportional enforcement costs then leads to efficiency loss.
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of relationship-specificity. A higher degree of relationship-specificity,
captured by a lower ωni, worsens the supplier’s outside option and
hence lowers his payoff under the settlement.
Going back in time, the supplier chooses q to maximize his profits,
given piecewise by (4) and (5). The supplier’s profit function is con-
tinuous at q∗, and the shape of the ex-ante specified payoff schedule
M does not affect pis. This means that the intermediary is unable to
punish the supplier for producing less than the stipulated quantity,
and q < q∗ may happen in equilibrium.
Optimal Contract We now turn to the intermediary’s problem of
finding an optimal contract. He chooses a contract (M,q∗) that maxi-
mizes his payoff pib subject to participation by the supplier,
(M,q∗) = arg max
(Mˆ,qˆ∗)
pib
(
qs(Mˆ, qˆ∗), Mˆ, qˆ∗
)
(6)
s.t. pis
(
qs(Mˆ, qˆ∗), Mˆ, qˆ∗
)
> 0 (7)
where qs(Mˆ, qˆ∗) is the supplier’s profit-maximizing quantity,
qs(Mˆ, qˆ∗) = arg max
q>0
pis(q, Mˆ, qˆ∗).
Since there is no ex-post efficiency loss, the intermediary’s payoff pib
is the total surplus minus the supplier’s payoff,
pib
(
q, Mˆ, qˆ∗
)
= R(q) − qcni(j) − pis
(
q, Mˆ, qˆ∗
)
.
In the solution to the contracting game above, we have shown that
a contract (M,q∗) enters the payoff functions in each case only in an
additive manner. Therefore, by setting q∗ and M, the intermediary
can only influence the supplier’s decision by shifting the threshold
for breach q∗. In choosing an optimal contract, the intermediary thus
decides whether he wants to implement the interior maximum in
the case of breach by the seller (case 1), or the interior maximum
in case of fulfillment by the supplier (case 2). He will choose the
case that is associated with the smaller amount of distortions. The
following proposition formalizes this intuition, and characterizes the
equilibrium under an optimal contract. It describes (1) the produced
quantity, (2) whether the equilibrium features a breach or a fulfillment
by the seller, and (3) the distribution of the rents between the two
parties. A.1 contains the proof.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium under an optimal contract) An optimal con-
tract (M,q∗) satisfies the following properties:
1. The quantity implemented, qs(M,q∗), satisfies
dR(q)
dq
∣∣∣∣
q=qs(M,q∗)
= min
(
2−ωni,
1
1− 12δ
)
c (8)
2. qs(M,q∗) < q∗ if and only if (1− 12δ)
−1 < 2−ωni.
1.2 a macroeconomic model of input sourcing 15
3. The whole surplus from the relationship goes to the intermediary:
pis (qs(M,q∗),M,q∗) = 0
To interpret this result, it is helpful to compare the equilibrium
quantity qs(M,q∗) to the first-best quantity q˜, which is defined as the
quantity that maximizes the overall surplus from the relationship,
q˜ ≡ arg max
q>0
R(q) − qcni(j).
The first statement of Proposition 1 says that the equilibrium quan-
tity produced under an optimal contract, qs(M,q∗), is lower than the
first-best quantity q˜ (recall that R is concave, and that 2−ωni > 1).
The intuition for the efficiency loss depends on whether the equilib-
rium features a breach or a fulfillment by the supplier. If the supplier
breaches by producing q < q∗, the presence of proportional enforce-
ment costs mean that the supplier could only recover a smaller frac-
tion of his fee net of damages by going to court. Under the settlement
he does not get the full return on his effort, which causes him to ex-
ante produce less than the efficient quantity. Note that in the absence
of enforcement costs (δ = 0), the supplier completely internalizes
the intermediary’s payoff through the expectation damages, and the
resulting outcome would be first-best. Hence, the magnitude of the
efficiency loss in this case depends solely on the magnitude of en-
forcement costs. In the case where the supplier fulfills his part of the
contract, q > q∗, the degree of relationship-specificity governs the
supplier’s outside option in the bargaining, and thus the marginal
return on production. A higher relationship-specificity (lower ωni)
means that the supplier’s outside option becomes worse, which re-
sults in a lower payoff under the settlement. The supplier anticipates
the lower ex-post return on production, and produces less (Klein et
al., 1979).
The second statement says that the optimal contract implements
a breach by the seller if and only if the cost of enforcement is low
compared to the degree of relationship-specificity. Given that it is
impossible to implement the efficient quantity, the optimal contract
implements the case with the lower associated distortions (hence also
the minimum function in expression (8)). If the cost of enforcement
is relatively low, the optimal contract implements a breach by setting
a high q∗: after the hold-up, the control over the produced units is
with the intermediary, and the supplier’s only asset is the enforceable
contract whose value depends on the (relatively low) enforcement
costs. On the other hand, when the degree of relationship-specificity
is low and enforcement costs are high, the optimal contract will pick
a low q∗ to allocate the residual rights of control over the excess
production q−q∗ with the supplier. In that case, his ex-post return on
production depends on his ability to reverse the production (i.e. the
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parameter ωni). Hence, the optimal contract maximizes the surplus
by maximizing the producer’s ex-post return on production.28
The third statement says that the above is implementable while still
allocating the whole surplus from the relationship to the intermediary.
This is not trivial, since the supplier’s payoff schedule M is required
to be nonnegative.
The reader may be concerned about the possibility of ’overproduc-
tion’ (q > q∗) arising as an equilibrium outcome in the model despite
there being little evidence on this actually happening in practice. The
right way to interpret such an equilibrium is as an outcome to an
informal contract, where the option to enforce the claim in a court
is either non-existent or irrelevant. Indeed, a contract where M = 0
and q∗ = 0 would be equivalent to the situation where enforceable
contract are not available, as in the literature on incomplete contracts
(Klein et al., 1979, and others). The only reason why the optimal con-
tract in this case features a small but positive q∗ is because this al-
lows the intermediary to obtain the full surplus from the relationship.
If I allowed for an ex-ante transfer from the supplier to the interme-
diary, setting q∗ and M to zero would be an optimal contract in the
case where the degree of relationship-specificity is relatively low com-
pared to enforcement costs.29
To summarize, the main benefit of having enforceable contracts is
that when the stipulated quantity q∗ is sufficiently high, the degree
of relationship-specificity does not matter for the resulting allocation
and the ex-ante investment. The drawback is that the presence of en-
forcement costs distorts the supplier’s decision. Hence, choosing a
high q∗ will only be optimal if the degree of relationship-specificity
is sufficiently high, so that the efficiency loss associated with a breach
is lower than the efficiency loss associated with an unenforceable con-
tract.
The model also yields a qualitative prediction on the occurrence of
breach, which I will use later to construct an empirical measure of
relationship-specificity.
Corollary 1 (Relationship-specificity and breach) Let δ < 1 and the
parties sign an optimal contract. Then, for sufficiently high degree of relationship-
specificity (i.e. for a sufficiently low ωni) the seller breaches the contract in
equilibrium.
1.2.1.3 Returning to the Firm’s Outsourcing Decision
How does the contracting game fit into the macromodel? The inter-
mediary’s profit-maximization problem is exactly the problem of find-
ing an optimal contract, (6) – (7), where the revenue function R(q) is
28 This is similar to the optimal allocation of property rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986,
Hart and Moore, 1990).
29 The model thus makes a case for the possible desirability of informal contracts: if
the degree of relationship-specificity is low and enforcement costs are high, it is
preferable to choose an informal contract rather than specifying a high q∗ and have
the supplier underperform due to the presence of high enforcement costs.
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the product of the quantity q and the downstream sector firm’s in-
verse demand function for activity (n, i, j). The produced quantity
under the optimal contract is then given by equation (8) in Proposi-
tion 1. The quantity distortion from the contracting frictions induces
a move along the downstream sector firm’s demand curve, and hence
increases the price to the downstream sector firm. We obtain the price
of activity (n, i, j) under arm’s length transaction by inserting the pro-
duced quantity into the inverse demand function:
pxni(j) =
µnpidni
zni(j)
where µn = σn/ (σn − 1) is the markup due to monopolistic compe-
tition, and
dni = min
(
2−ωni,
1
1− 12δ
)
(9)
is the resulting price distortion due to contracting frictions. The func-
tional form of dni in terms of the parameters ωni and δ is exactly the
same as the distortion in equation (8).
Going back in time, the downstream sector firms decide on whether
to produce in-house or to outsource by comparing the price of the
good under the two regimes, plni(j) and p
x
ni(j). Given the perfect
substitutability between the two options, the realized price of activity
(n, i, j) is
pni(j) = min
(
plni(j),p
x
ni(j)
)
(10)
1.2.2 Households’ Preferences and Endowments
There is a representative household with Cobb-Douglas preferences
over the consumption of goods from each sector,
U =
N∏
i=1
c
ηi
i , (11)
with
∑N
i=1 ηi = 1. Households have a fixed labor endowment L
and receive labor income wL and the profits of the intermediaries
Π. Their budget constraint is
∑N
i=1 pici 6 wL+Π, and thus pici =
ηi (wL+Π).
1.2.3 Equilibrium Prices and Allocations
I first describe prices and input use under cost minimization, and
then define an equilibrium of the macromodel and give sufficient
conditions for existence and uniqueness. All proofs are in A.1.
To describe sectoral price levels and expenditure shares, some def-
initions are helpful. Let Xni ≡
∫1
0 pni(j)qni(j)1{j:pxni(j)<plni(j)}dj be
the expenditure of sector n firms on activities that are sourced from
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sector i, and Xn =
∫1
0 pni(j)qni(j)dj the total expenditure (and gross
output) of sector n. We then have
Proposition 2 (Sectoral price levels and expenditure shares) Under cost
minimization by the downstream sector firms, the following statements hold:
1. The cost of producing one unit of raw output yn in sector n is
pn ≡
(
N∑
i=1
γni
(
αn
(
Snw
−θ + Ti (piµndni)
−θ
)− 1θ)1−ρ)1/(1−ρ)
(12)
where w is the wage, and αn ≡
(
Γ
(
1−σn
θ + 1
)) 1
1−σn , with Γ(·)
being the gamma function.
2. The input expenditure shares Xni/Xn satisfy
Xni
Xn
= γniα
1−ρ
n p
ρ−1
n
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ(
Snw−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
)1+(1−ρ)/θ .
(13)
Furthermore, Xni/Xn is decreasing in dni.
Proposition 2 gives expressions for the sectoral price levels and in-
termediate input expenditure shares. The sectoral price levels solve
the system of equations (12), and depend on the cost of production
under outsourcing and in-house production, and therefore on the pro-
ductivity parameters Ti and Sn, as well as contracting frictions dni.
The fact that suppliers may themselves outsource part of their pro-
duction process gives rise to input-output linkages between sectors;
the sectoral price levels are thus a weighted harmonic mean of the
price levels of the other sectors. This amplifies the price distortions:
an increase in the price of coal increases the prices of steel and ma-
chines, which in turn increases the cost of producing steel due to the
steel industry’s reliance on heavy machinery.
The expenditure shares on intermediate inputs, equation (13), are
then determined by the relative effective cost of outsourcing versus
in-house production. Higher effective cost of outsourcing will lead
downstream firms to produce more activities in-house instead of out-
sourcing them. Thus, the expenditure share of sector n on inputs from
sector i is increasing in sector i’s productivity, Ti, and the importance
of sector i products for sector n, γni, and decreasing in sector i’s
input cost pi and contracting frictions dni.
Proposition 2 yields the key qualitative prediction of the model,
namely that contracting frictions, captured by dni > 1, negatively af-
fect the downstream sector’s fraction of expenditure on intermediate
inputs from the upstream sector i. The elasticity θ determines the
magnitude of this effect. The downstream firm may substitute away
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from input bundles that have become more costly due to the contract-
ing frictions, as governed by the elasticity of substitution between
input baskets ρ.
On an algebraic level, equation (13) closely resembles a structural
gravity equation in international trade, with intermediate input ex-
penditure shares replacing trade shares, and contracting frictions dni
replacing trade barriers. This is the result of modeling the outsourc-
ing decision in a similar way to Eaton and Kortum’s way of modeling
the international sourcing decision, and simplifies the quantitative
evaluation of the model. In section 1.4 I use equation (13) to estimate
the key parameters, including θ and ρ, and use these estimates to
study the importance of costly contract enforcement for aggregate
productivity and welfare.
I now proceed to closing the model. Intermediaries make profits
due to monopolistic competition
Π =
∑
n
∑
i
Πni =
∑
n
∑
i
(
1−
σn − 1
σn
1
dni
)
Xni (14)
and the markets for sectoral output clear
pici +
∑
n
(Xni −Πni) = Xi, i = 1, . . . ,N (15)
An equilibrium is then a vector of sectoral price functions (pn(w))n=1,...,N
that satisfies (12). Given the sectoral prices, all other prices and quan-
tities can be directly calculated: input shares (Xni/Xn)n,i from (13),
and profits Π and gross output levels (Xn)n=1,...,N from the linear sys-
tem (14) and (15), where consumption levels are ci = ηi (wL+Π) /pi.
The following proposition gives a set of sufficient conditions for exis-
tence and uniqueness of an equilibrium:
Proposition 3 (Sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence and uniqueness)
Let Ξ be the matrix with elements Ξni = (αnµn)
−θ γ
θ/(ρ−1)
ni Ti for all
n, i = 1, . . . ,N. Assume that
1. the spectral radius of Ξ is strictly less than one, and
2. 0 < θ/ (ρ− 1) < 1.
Then, for all (dni)n,i with dni > 1 for all n, i, an equilibrium price vector
(pn(w))n=1,...,N exists and is unique. Furthermore, pn(w) is homogenous
of degree one in w.
The condition that the spectral radius of Ξ is less than one rules
out ’infinite loops’ in the production process, i.e. that one basket of
sectoral output goods can be used as inputs to produce more than
one basket of the same goods.
1.3 reduced-form empirical evidence
In this section I present qualitative evidence that is consistent with
my model’s predictions. To do that, I exploit cross-country variation
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in intermediate input expenditure shares, enforcement costs, and vari-
ation across sector-pairs in the degree to which they rely on formal
enforcement. The statements I make here are entirely of a qualitative
nature. Later, I will turn to the quantitative importance of contracting
frictions for outsourcing and welfare by structurally estimating the
model from Section 1.2.
To empirically operationalize the model, I here state a corollary to
Proposition 2.
Corollary 2 For sufficiently high relationship-specificity 1 −ωni, sector
n’s expenditure share on intermediary inputs from sector i is strictly de-
creasing in the enforcement costs δ.
The corollary directly follows from the fact that the expenditure share
Xni/Xn is strictly decreasing in dni (Proposition 2), and that dni is
strictly increasing in δ for sufficiently low ωni (equation (9)). As ex-
plained in Section 1.2, when there is high relationship-specificity, the
supplier and intermediary write contracts such that the supplier’s
outside option in ex-post bargaining is based on a threat to go to
court, rather than a threat to revert production and sell it elsewhere.
In these cases, the better the courts work the smaller the inefficiency
and the larger the quantity supplied. This results in firms being more
willing to outsource their production, and hence a higher intermedi-
ate input expenditure share.
In this section I bring Corollary 2 to the data by estimating the
following reduced-form regression:
Xcni
Xcn
= αni +α
c
i +α
c
n +βδ
c(1−ωni) + ε
c
ni (16)
where Xcni is the total expenditure of sector n in country c on inter-
mediate inputs from sector i, both domestically and internationally
sourced; Xcn is the gross output of industry n in country c; δc is a
country-level measure of enforcement cost; 1 −ωni is relationship-
specificity; αni are sector-pair fixed effects; αci are upstream sector
times country fixed effects, and αcn are downstream sector times coun-
try fixed effects. In this equation, the expenditure share on intermedi-
ate inputs is a function of an interaction of a sector-pair characteristic
(relationship-specificity) with a country characteristic (enforcement
costs), as well as characteristics of the upstream and downstream sec-
tors in the country, and sector-pair characteristics that are invariant
across countries. A negative value for β implies that a worsening of
formal contract enforcement has particularly adverse effects on out-
sourcing in sector pairs characterized by high relationship-specificity,
as predicted by Corollary 2. Equation (16) exploits variation in bilat-
eral expenditure shares across countries, controlling for factors that
affect the expenditure shares on the upstream side (such as sectoral
productivity levels, skill and capital endowments, land and natural
resources, but also institutional and policy factors such as subsidies,
access to external financing, and import tariffs) and downstream side
(firm scale, taxes).
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Equation (16) is similar to the functional form used by Rajan and
Zingales (1998) and subsequent papers, who explain country-sector-
level variables using an interaction of a country-specific variable with
a sector-specific variable. This literature typically goes to great lengths
to try to control for the plethora of confounding factors that co-vary
with the interaction term. Still, some of these factors may be left
unaccounted, or badly proxied, for. My specification improves on
this by exploiting variation across countries and bilateral sector pairs.
This allows me to include upstream sector-country level fixed effects,
thereby controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the upstream sec-
tors.
1.3.1 Data
Input expenditure shares I use cross-country data on input expendi-
ture from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database, version 8
(Narayanan et al., 2012).30 It contains input-output tables on 109 coun-
tries, from varying years ranging from the beginning of the 1990’s to
mid-2000 and typically originating from national statistical sources.
See 24 in A.3 for detailed information on data availability and the
primary source of each country’s input-output table. A notable qual-
ity of this dataset is that it includes many developing countries, for
which industry-level data is typically scarce. The tables cover domes-
tic and import expenditure for 56 sectors, which I aggregate up to 35
sectors that roughly correspond to two-digit sectors in ISIC Revision
3. To have a more direct link to my model’s predictions, I use input
expenditure shares rather than expenditure levels.31 Table 1 contains
summary statistics on expenditure shares at the country level.
Table 1: Summary statistics for country-wide input shares
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Intermediate Input Share 0.53 0.08 0.25 0.69 109
Domestic Intermediate Input Share 0.37 0.08 0.12 0.58 109
Note: ‘Intermediate input share’ refers to the sum of all intermediate inputs
(materials) in gross output. The domestic intermediate input share is defined
analogously, but only includes domestically sourced intermediate inputs.
Enforcement cost The World Bank Doing Business project provides
country-level information on the monetary cost and time necessary to
30 Recent papers outside the literature on CGE models that have used the GTAP input-
output tables are Johnson and Noguera (2011) and Shapiro (2013).
31 There is a large related literature in industrial organization that measures the degree
of vertical integration as the fraction of value added in gross output (see Adleman,
1955, Levy, 1985, Holmes, 1999, and also Macchiavello, 2009). My measure is similar,
but distinguishes between intermediate inputs from different sectors. Furthermore,
my data for intermediate input shares directly map into the theoretical counterpart
in the model. I discuss concerns regarding the observability of firm boundaries in
section 1.3.3.
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enforce a fictional supplier contract in a local civil court. The contract
is assumed to govern the sale of goods between a buyer and a seller
in the country’s largest business city. The value of the sale is 200% of
the country’s income per capita. The monetary cost is the total cost
that the plaintiff (who is assumed to be the seller) must advance to
enforce the contract in a court, and is measured as a fraction of the
value of the claim. It includes court fees, fees for expert witnesses,
attorney fees, and any costs that the seller must advance to enforce
the judgment though a sale of the buyer’s assets. The time until
enforcement is measured from the point where the seller decides to
initiate litigation, to the point where the judgment is enforced, i.e. the
payments are received. I construct a total cost measure – again, as a
fraction of the value of the claim – by adding the interest foregone
during the proceedings, assuming a three percent interest rate:32
δc = (monetary cost, in pct)c+0.03 (time until enforcement, years)c .
I use the cost measures for the year 2005, or, depending on availability,
the closest available year to 2005.
Relationship-specificity Recall that in the model, the more relationship-
specific is the good exchanged between the sectors, the more the
parties rely on formal contract enforcement to minimize distortions.
Hence, for my empirical implementation, I proxy relationship-specificity
by “enforcement-intensity,” i.e. the frequency with which firms from
a particular sector-pair resolve conflicts in court. In particular, us-
ing data for the United States, for each pair of sectors I observe
the number of court cases over a fixed period of time. Sector pairs
with relatively more cases are considered to have higher relationship-
specificity.33
My data come from the LexisLibrary database provided by Lexis-
Nexis. It contains cases from US federal and state courts. I take all
cases between January 1990 and December 2012 that are related to
contract law, ignoring appeal and higher courts, and match the plain-
tiff and defendant’s names to the Orbis database of firms, provided
32 The expression is the proportional cost associated with a linear approximation of
v(1−monetary cost, pct)/(1+discount rate)(time, yrs), where v is a future payment. I
obtain very similar results when using an eight percent interest rate instead of three
percent.
33 Note that in my model the two parties do not actually go to court, but settle in order
to avoid the enforcement costs. This is a result of my contracting game being entirely
deterministic: if the outcome of the enforcement is known in advance, there is no
point in actually going to court. It would be straightforward to extend the game to
a setting where, in some cases, the parties do actually end up in court; however, the
resulting friction would then be stochastic and it would be impossible to integrate
the contracting into the general-equilibrium macromodel. One simple way to get the
prediction of more litigation for higher degree of relationship-specificity would be to
change the model by assuming that (1) parties cannot settle outside of court with an
exogenous probability, and (2) the possibility of an ex-ante transfer from the supplier
to the intermediary, so that an informal contract (q∗ = 0 and M = 0) is optimal in
the case when relationship-specificity is low. Then, the threat of litigation only occurs
in the case of seller breach, and higher relationship-specificity is associated with a
higher prevalence of litigation.
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by Bureau Van Dijk.34 Orbis contains the 4-digit SIC industry clas-
sification of firms; I thus know in which sectors the plaintiffs and
defendants are active in. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (1996) doc-
uments that in cases related to the sale of goods or provision of ser-
vices between two businesses, the seller is more than seven times
more likely to be the plaintiff. I thus assign the plaintiff to the up-
stream industry. To obtain the likelihood of litigation between the
two sectors, I divide the observed number of cases by a proxy for the
number of buyer-seller relationships. If each downstream sector firm
has exactly one supplier in each upstream sector, the correct way to
normalize is to use the number of firms in the downstream sector.
This yields a measure z(1)ni . Since the presence of more firms in the
upstream sector may mean that there are more buyer-seller relation-
ships, I construct an alternative measure where I divide the number
of cases by the geometric mean of the number of firms active in the
upstream and downstream industries, yielding a measure z(2)ni .
35,36
I interpret these two measures as related to the likelihood of litiga-
tion, and hence enforcement-intensity, for each pair of sectors. Table
2 shows summary statistics for z(1)ni and z
(2)
ni .
z
(1)
ni =
(# cases between sectors i and n)
(# firms in sector n)
, (17)
z
(2)
ni =
(# cases between sectors i and n)√
(# firms in sector i) (# firms in sector n)
(18)
My measure is conceptually different from existing measures of
relationship-specificity/contract-intensity along three key dimensions.37
First, the existing measures are only available for physical goods,
whereas my measures cover services sectors as well. Second, the exist-
ing measures depend on input share data or assume that input shares
are constant across countries. In section 1.3.2 I document that input
shares vary sharply across countries, which renders the existing mea-
sures inapplicable to the study of cross-country input use patterns.
Third, and most relevant to my identification strategy, my measure
varies across bilateral sector-pairs, instead of being associated with
the upstream sector. Given that the sectors in my dataset are fairly
broad, it is likely that the products being sold to one sector are quite
different to the ones sold to other sectors. The fact that my measure
is sector-pair-specific is key to my identification strategy, as it allows
me to include upstream sector-country fixed effects to control for un-
observed sector characteristics like productivity.
34 See A.3 for details on the construction of matches and matching statistics.
35 I use the number of firms in Orbis. The results are extremely similar when using the
number of firms from the Census Bureau’s Statistics on U.S. Businesses instead.
36 Results are robust to dividing the cases by the number of upstream sector firms as
well.
37 There are three existing measures of contract-intensity (sometimes directly inter-
preted as relationship-specificity). Nunn (2007) uses the fraction of a sector’s inputs
that are traded on an organized exchange, Levchenko (2007) uses the Herfindahl in-
dex of input shares, and Bernard et al. (2010) measure contractability as the weighted
share of wholesalers in overall importers.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for enforcement-intensity measures
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max N Correlation with Xni/Xn
z
(1)
ni 5.34·10−5 1.778 ·10−4 0 .00303 1225 0.17
z
(2)
ni 2.22·10−5 0.586 ·10−4 0 .00122 1225 0.29
Note: The table shows summary statistics for the relationship-specificity
measures z(1)ni and z
(2)
ni , as defined by equation (18). The correlation be-
tween the two variables is 0.48.
Table 3: Average enforcement-intensity of upstream sectors, z(2)ni mea-
sure
Upstream sector z(2)ni ∗ 104 Upstream sector z(2)ni ∗ 104
Insurance 1.099 Transport nec 0.163
Business services nec 0.785 Gas manufacture, distribution 0.118
Financial services nec 0.548 Transport equipment nec 0.116
Electricity 0.443 Food products and beverages 0.114
Trade 0.388 Recreation and other services 0.112
Chemical,rubber,plastic prods 0.357 Mineral products nec 0.109
Paper products, publishing 0.354 Electronic equipment 0.108
PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat 0.351 Oil and Gas 0.104
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 0.286 Wearing apparel 0.072
Metal products 0.233 Motor vehicles and parts 0.069
Communication 0.221 Water 0.044
Ferrous metals 0.22 Minerals nec 0.040
Metals nec 0.211 Petroleum, coal products 0.036
Machinery and equipment nec 0.199 Coal 0.035
Construction 0.198 Textiles 0.032
Air transport 0.194 Wood products 0.028
Manufactures nec 0.194 Leather products 0.019
Sea transport 0.176
Note: The table shows the enforcement-intensity z(2)ni of an upstream sector i, averaged across
downstream sectors. z(2)ni is defined as the number of court cases where a sector i firm sues a
sector n firm, divided by the geometric mean of the number of firms in sectors n and i.
Table 3 shows the ranking of upstream sectors by the average de-
gree of enforcement-intensity, as measured by z(2)ni (the ranking for
z
(1)
ni is very similar). Services sectors are on average more contract-
intensive than manufacturing sectors, which are in turn more contract-
intensive than raw materials-producing sectors. This is broadly in
line with the interpretation of enforcement-intensity as the degree
of relationship-specificity (Monteverde and Teece, 1982, Masten 1984,
Nunn, 2007). Once a service has been performed, it cannot be sold
to a third party, thus the scope for hold-up should be high. On the
other end of the spectrum, raw materials have low depreciability and
may be readily obtained through organized markets, thus there is
relatively little scope for hold-up.
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1.3.2 Cross-country Dispersion in Input-Output Tables
Table 4: Cross-country dispersion in two-digit intermediate input
shares
I. Average standard deviations of intermediate input expenditure shares
σ
All sector pairs .023
Goods-producing upstream sectors only .020
Services-producing upstream sectors only .028
II. Frequency distribution of standard deviations of input expenditure shares, σni
Category # sector pairs % of total
All 1225 100
σni < .02 838 68.4
.02 < σni < .04 194 15.8
.04 < σni < .06 68 5.6
.06 < σni < .08 46 3.8
.08 < σni < .1 18 1.5
.1 < σni < .15 34 2.8
σni > .15 27 2.2
Note: The table presents statistics regarding the cross-country dispersion
of intermediate input expenditure shares, at the two-digit sector-pair level.
Part I shows means of the standard deviations, Part II shows the frequency
distribution of standard deviations. All intermediate input shares cover both
domestically and internationally sourced inputs.
Table 4 shows the dispersion of intermediate input shares at the
two-digit level from their respective means.38 To obtain the numbers
in the first part of the table, I first calculated the standard deviation
of the intermediate input shares for each sector-pair, and then took
averages of these standard deviations. The average dispersion of ex-
penditure shares across all sector-pairs is 2.3 percentage points. For
services-producing upstream sectors, the dispersion is significantly
higher (at the 1% level) than for sectors that produce physical goods.
Most striking, however, is the fact that here is a sizeable number of
sector-pairs for which the cross-country dispersion in input expendi-
ture shares is high. The second part of Table 4 shows that for roughly
5 percent of sector pairs, the standard deviation is greater than 10
percentage points.
For which inputs is the cross-country dispersion in expenditure
shares particularly large? Figure 2 shows for every upstream sector
the expenditure share on this sector, averaged across downstream sec-
tors. I use unweighted averages, to make sure the cross-country varia-
tion in the resulting input shares is not due to a different sectoral com-
position. The left panel shows that the dispersion is higher for inputs
with higher average expenditure shares. Still, even in log-deviations
there is considerable heterogeneity across inputs. Among the inputs
38 See Jones (2011b) for a comparison of input-output tables among OECD economies.
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Figure 2: Cross-country distribution of input shares by upstream sec-
tor
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Source: Author's calculations from GTAP 8 data. Excludes outliers.
Unweighted averages across downstream sectors
Cross-country distribution of input shares by upstream sector
with high average expenditure shares, the (wholesale and retail) trade,
business services, electricity, transport, and financial services sectors
show particularly high dispersion across countries. Note that these
sectors are also particularly contract-intensive, as shown by Table 3,
whereas the percentage-wise cross-country dispersion in input shares
on the (not very contract-intensive) oil and gas and petroleum and
coal products sectors is relatively low. This suggests that contract-
ing frictions may play a role for external input use. In the following
regressions I will try to rule out (or at least control for) alternative
explanations.
1.3.3 Results
Table 5 presents the results of estimating equation (16) using ordinary
least squares (standard errors clustered at the country level in paren-
theses). The first two columns include only sector-pair fixed effects,
and do not correct for sectoral productivity differences across coun-
tries. Nevertheless, the estimates of the interaction term’s coefficient,
β, are negative. Columns (3) and (4) correct for the presence of un-
observed heterogeneity in the upstream sectors by including fixed
effect for each upstream sector-country pair. The estimates of the
coefficient increase in magnitude, suggesting that the specifications
that exclude upstream sector-level characteristics suffer from omitted
variable bias. Both estimates are now significant at the .1% level. In
columns (5) and (6) I also include downstream sector-country fixed
effects to control for differences in the size of the downstream sectors
across countries. The interaction coefficients increase slightly as a re-
sult, and remain statistically significant. I interpret the results from
Table 5: The Determinants of Expenditure Shares on Intermediates: Benchmark Results
Dependent variable: Expenditure share of sector n on intermediate inputs from sector i, Xcni/X
c
n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contract enforcement interaction : δc(#Casesni/
√
#Firmsn#Firmsi) -71.78∗∗∗ -101.0∗∗∗ -120.3∗∗∗
(15.39) (24.07) (28.53)
Contract enforcement interaction : δc(#Casesni/#Firmsn) -9.246 -14.42∗∗∗ -15.35∗∗∗
(4.829) (3.987) (4.176)
Upstream × Downstream fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country fixed effects Yes Yes
N 133525 133525 133525 133525 133525 133525
R2 0.447 0.447 0.531 0.531 0.537 0.537
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level
Note: Dependent variable is the expenditure of sector n in country c on domestically and internationally sourced intermediate
inputs from sector i, divided by the total gross output of sector n in country c.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5 as supporting my model’s prediction that in countries with
high enforcement costs, sectors are using less inputs that rely heavily
on contract enforcement. The estimates in columns (5) and (6), my
preferred specifications, imply that a one-standard deviation change
in each of the interacted variables decreases the input share by .13
and .05 percentage points, respectively. I will discuss the quantitative
effects of enforcement costs in more detail in section 1.4, using my
structural estimates.
One potential concern is that my dependent variable, the expen-
diture share on intermediate inputs, does not correctly measure out-
sourcing. Indeed, the unit of observation that underlies the construc-
tion of an input-output table is the plant, meaning that intra-firm
transactions between plants belonging to different sectors also show
up in the expenditure on intermediate inputs.39 In order to resolve
this concern, I repeat the above regressions using only sector-pairs
where the upstream sector is a services sector. Since services that are
performed within the firm boundaries are typically not priced and
are thus not included in the firm-level questionnaires that underlie
the construction of input-output tables, the likelihood of the observed
transactions being within the firm boundaries is much lower. The first
two columns in Table 6 show that the resulting point estimates are
smaller in magnitude, but still statistically significant at the 5 percent
level.
There is an extensive and growing literature that documents that
social capital, particularly trust, may help in overcoming frictions.40
Bloom et al. (2012) document that interpersonal trust affects the in-
ternal organization of firms through decentralization. Thus, there is
the possibility that trust also affects the make-or-buy decision, which
could mean that enforcement costs do not accurately capture the mag-
nitude of frictions between firms and potentially lead to biased esti-
mates. To address this concern, I include an interaction of a country-
level trust measure with enforcement-intensity. I follow the consensus
in the literature by measuring trust as the fraction of people that re-
spond to the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful when dealing
with others?” with “Most people can be trusted” as opposed to “Need
to be very careful”. I use the numbers reported by Algan and Cahuc
(2013) in their Figure 1, which in turn are based on data from the
World Values Survey, European Values Survey, and Afrobarometer.
39 That said, Atalay et al. (2003) document that shipments of physical goods between
vertically integrated plants in the U.S. are surprisingly low – less than .1 percent of
overall value for the median plant.
40 See Algan and Cahuc (2013) for a survey of the relationship between trust and
growth.
Table 6: The Determinants of Expenditure Shares on Intermediates: Robustness
Dependent variable: Expenditure share of sector n on intermediate inputs from sector i, Xcni,dom/X
c
n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contract enforcement interaction : δc(#Casesni/
√
#Firmsn#Firmsi) -90.24∗∗∗ -72.24∗∗ -123.6∗∗∗
(25.01) (23.29) (30.24)
Contract enforcement interaction : δc(#Casesni/#Firmsn) -7.871∗ -12.65∗∗ -15.71∗∗∗
(3.796) (3.191) (4.635)
Trust interaction : trustc(#Casesni/
√
#Firmsn#Firmsi) 29.99 4.808
(43.62) (54.78)
Trust interaction : trustc(#Casesni/#Firmsn) 0.692 -7.113
(5.996) (8.099)
High US expenditure share × enforcement cost: IUSni δc -0.0082 -0.011∗
(0.004) (0.0048)
High US expenditure share × trust: IUSni trustc -0.0007 -0.0006
(0.005) (0.005)
Upstream × Downstream fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Up services Up services Full Full Full Full
N 53410 53410 106575 106575 106575 106575
R2 0.459 0.459 0.482 0.481 0.566 0.566
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level
Note: Dependent variable is the fraction of expenditure of sector n on intermediate inputs from sector i in country c in total gross output of sector n in country
c. Specifications (1) and (2) uses the subsample where the upstream sector is a services sector (defined as anything except agriculture, mining, and manufacturing).
Specifications (3) to (6) use the subsample of countries where the trust measure is available (i.e. all countries except Bahrain, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Sri Lanka,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Cote d’Ivoire, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Laos, Mauritius, Mongolia, Oman, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Tunisia, Qatar, and the UAE).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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The estimates of the trust interaction’s coefficient come out as in-
significant at the 5-percent level, as reported in specifications (3) and
(4) of Table 6. The coefficient on the enforcement cost interaction re-
mains negative and statistically significant. This suggests that while
trust may be a way to alleviate frictions in informal interpersonal re-
lationships, they may not be a substitute for enforcement of formal
contracts between businesses in a court.
There is a concern that my measure of enforcement-intensity is
capturing to some extent the magnitude of intersectoral expenditure
flows in the United States, perhaps because of the lack of data for
the number of buyer-seller relationships to normalize the number of
court cases (and the possibility that the proxies in (18) are unsatis-
factory). I construct a dummy IUSni that takes the value 1 if the inter-
mediate input expenditure share in the US is above the median US
expenditure share, and 0 otherwise. In specifications (5) and (6) of Ta-
ble 6, I include an interaction of Ini with enforcement costs, and with
trust. The key explanatory variable, the interaction of enforcement
cost with enforcement-intensity, remains statistically significant.41
Given that my dependent variable in the above regressions is the
expenditure share on both imported and domestically sourced inter-
mediate inputs, it is natural to ask whether the lack of distinction
between the two modes of sourcing matters. Table 7 shows the re-
sults from estimating equation 16 with the expenditure share of do-
mestically sourced inputs in gross output as the dependent variable.
The point estimates of the interaction term’s coefficient are slightly
smaller than before. One is led to speculate that in domestic transac-
tions, alternative ways to resolve hold-ups may be more relevant than
in international transactions.
1.4 structural estimation, and quantitative results
In this section I return to my model from Section 1.2 and structurally
estimate the key parameters using the dataset from the previous sec-
tion. I then perform a set of counterfactuals to evaluate the impor-
tance of enforcement costs for aggregate welfare.
1.4.1 Identifiability and Estimation Strategy
To guide the estimation strategy, it is helpful to first establish which
parameters we need to identify. I am ultimately interested in aggre-
gate welfare, which I measure as real income per capita. Since the
wage is the numeraire, we have that
Yc
PcLc
=
1+Πc/Lc
Pc
where P is the consumer’s price index in country c. Thus, changes in
income per capita come about from changes in the consumer’s price
41 Results are very similar when including the US input-output expenditure shares
interacted with enforcement costs, instead of Iniδc.
Table 7: The Determinants of Expenditure Shares on Intermediates: Domestic Inputs Only
Dependent variable: Expenditure share of sector n on domestic intermediate inputs from sector i, Xcni,dom/X
c
n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contract enforcement interaction : δc(#Casesni/
√
#Firmsn#Firmsi) -45.14∗∗ -63.46∗∗∗ -72.11∗∗∗
(13.37) (17.58) (21.68)
Contract enforcement interaction : δc(#Casesni/#Firmsn) -7.713 -10.75∗∗∗ -10.80∗∗∗
(4.531) (2.882) (2.971)
Upstream × Downstream fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country fixed effects Yes Yes
N 133525 133525 133525 133525 133525 133525
R2 0.315 0.315 0.453 0.453 0.465 0.464
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level
Note: Dependent variable is the fraction of expenditure of sector n on domestic inputs from sector i in country c in total gross output of sector n in country c. The results
are robust towards inclusion of trust and IUSn interactions as used in Table 6.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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level and changes in profits per capita. The consumer price index is
Pc =
∏
i p
ηi
i . Profits can be calculated from intermediate input ex-
penditure levels Xcni =
(
Xcni/X
c
n
)
Xcn, which in turn can be calculated
from the market clearing conditions
ηi (L
c +Πc) +
∑
n
(Xcni −Π
c
ni) = X
c
i
for every i = 1, . . . ,N. Thus, aggregate welfare can be calculated
by knowing only the parameters vectors η = (ηi)i=1,...,N and σ =
(σn)n=1,...,N in addition to the equilibrium sectoral price levels pi
and the input-output expenditure shares Xcni/X
c
n. These are given by
the equations (12) and (13), which are equivalent to
p1−ρn =
N∑
i=1
([
γ
θ/(ρ−1)
ni α
−θ
n Sn
]
+
[
γ
θ/(ρ−1)
ni α
−θ
n Tiµ
−θ
n
]
(pidni)
−θ
)(ρ−1)/θ
(19)
Xni
Xn
= p1−ρn
[
γ
θ
ρ−1
ni α
−θ
n Tiµ
−θ
n
]
(pidni)
−θ
([
γ
θ
ρ−1
ni α
−θ
n Sn
]
+
[
γ
θ
ρ−1
ni α
−θ
n Tiµ
−θ
n
]
(pidni)
−θ
)1+(1−ρ)/θ(20)
Thus, it is possible to calculate the equilibrium prices and quantities
by knowing only the elasticities ρ and θ, the frictions dcni, and the
technology/productivity terms that are captured by the square brack-
ets. In other words, it is not necessary to identify the country-specific
productivity levels in order to perform the welfare counterfactuals.
This attractive feature of the model vastly simplifies the welfare anal-
ysis. I thus proceed in two steps:
1. Estimate the elasticities ρ and θ and the technology/productiv-
ity terms from data on input shares Xcni/X
c
n and contracting
frictions dcni, using equations (19) and (20). I construct the con-
tracting frictions dcni from enforcement costs δ
c and a structural
measure of relationship-specificity ωni, using the expression
from my model, dcni = min
(
1/(1− 12δ
c), 2−ωni
)
. I assume
that relationship-specificity ωni is given by
ω
(i)
ni = 1−m · z(i)ni .
Thus, the relative degrees of relationship-specificity are given
by the measure of enforcement-intensity coming from the court
data, z(i)ni . The parameter m, which I jointly estimate with the
other parameters, governs the magnitude of relationship-specificity
and therefore the importance of enforcement costs in shaping
contracting frictions dni.
2. I set the consumer’s Cobb-Douglas utility function parameters
ηi to equal the corresponding (country-specific) household ex-
penditure shares in the GTAP dataset. The last remaining param-
eters to determine are the σn, which are not identifiable through
equation (20), and enter the welfare calculations through the
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profit share. I set them equal to the values reported by Broda
and Weinstein (2006); for services sectors I use the average of
Broda and Weinstein’s values, which is 3.94. Since these elas-
ticities are fairly low and will imply higher profit shares than
what we observe in the data, I also pursue an alternative strat-
egy where I set the profit shares directly to the value observed
in the United States. More on this in Section 1.4.3 below.
I then calculate the changes in real income per capita when
the enforcement costs are set to US levels, using the estimated
elasticities ρ and θ, the magnitude parameter m, the calibrated
ηi and σn, and holding the estimated technology/productivity
terms constant.42
1.4.2 Estimation
I use the same dataset as in the reduced-form regressions of Section
1.3. My estimating equations are the model’s expressions for sectoral
price levels, equation (19), and intermediate input expenditure shares,
equation (20). Given the high dimsionality of the estimand (Tci and S
c
n
are each 3815 parameters, γni are an additional 1225), I use a simple
nonlinear least squares criterion:
(
mˆ, θˆ, ρˆ, σˆ, γˆ, Tˆ, Sˆ
)
= arg min
m,θ,ρ,σ,γ,T,S
∥∥∥∥XcniXcn − g (m, θ, ρ,σ,γ, T, S)
∥∥∥∥2
(21)
where
g (m, θ, ρ,σ,γ, T, S) = γniα1−ρn (p
c
n)
ρ−1 T
c
i
(
µnp
c
id
c
ni
)−θ(
Scn + T
c
i
(
µnp
c
id
c
ni
)−θ)1+(1−ρ)/θ
(22)
and the sectoral price levels are given by (19). I also impose the con-
ditions for existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium, Proposition
3. For every set of parameters I solve for the model’s equilibrium
price vector p and calculate the expenditure shares. For searching
over the parameter space I use a stochastic Simulated Annealing al-
gorithm (Kirkpatrick et al., 1983), which is designed to find global
minima. Simulated Annealing is not particularly good for pinning
down the exact minimum in a trough, thus I occasionally perform a
Newton-type search to get to the bottom of a valley. Even though it is
impossible to write g as a function of the parameters directly, the gra-
dient admits a closed-form expression, which makes this procedure
computationally feasible.
42 A series of recent papers, starting with Arkolakis et al. (2012), use a sufficient statis-
tic approach to study the welfare impact of trade barriers. Even though my setup
is structurally very similar to theirs, I cannot follow a sufficient statistic approach
because I would need to have data on each country’s input-output structure under
the counterfactual, i.e. under the enforcement costs of the US.
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Table 8: NLS estimates of θ and ρ
d
(1)
ni d
(2)
ni
θ 1.76 1.652
(0.757) (0.505)
log ρ 1.305 1.130
(0.267) (0.297)
N 133525 133525
Pseudo-R2 0.706 0.709
Note: The table shows partial results from the NLS
regression (21) and (22), using z(1)ni and z
(2)
ni , respec-
tively, to construct ω(1)ni and ω
(2)
ni . Robust standard er-
rors are in parentheses. The Pseudo-R2 is defined as
1−RSS/TSS.
Table 8 shows the estimation results, once using the preferred d(1)ni
measure of contracting frictions, and once with the alternative mea-
sure d(2)ni . The structural estimates of the elasticity of the input share,
θ, are 1.76 and 1.65, respectively, which is well below the trade elas-
ticities typically estimated using structural gravity equations (Head
and Mayer, 2013). The point estimates for the elasticity of substitu-
tion between broad input baskets ρ are 3.7 and 3.1. Lower values for ρ
would mean that the impact of contracting frictions on prices would
be larger, since firms are less able to substitute other input baskets
when frictions are large. I will regard the first specification, which
uses d(1)ni , as the benchmark, and will limit my discussion mostly to
the the results coming from these estimates. The other specification
generally yields larger welfare implications.
1.4.3 Welfare Analysis
Table 9 shows the increase in real income and decrease in the con-
sumer’s price index that would arise if each country’s enforcement
costs were set to US levels (17%). The first column lists the level
of enforcement costs before the change. The second and third col-
umn show the percentage change in real output per capita y and the
consumer price level Pc as the enforcement costs are reduced. The
magnitudes are sizable, ranging up to a 41.6% increase in real in-
come (23.5% drop in consumer prices) for the case of Indonesia. The
mean changes are a 3.6% increase in real income, and a 4.1% drop
in consumer prices. In Table 10, I show the average welfare changes
for different groups of countries. Enforcement costs are particularly
damaging in Africa and South-Eastern Asia. Figure 3 visualizes the
welfare gains. A reduction in enforcement costs by one percentage
point leads roughly to a 0.32% increase in real income.
According to equation (??), the change in real income can be de-
composed into two factors: (i) a drop in the consumer’s price index
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Figure 3: Welfare gains from setting enforcement costs to US levels
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Note: Welfare gains are calculated using the benchmark specification, column (1) in
Table 8.
Pc due to the decrease in the firm’s cost of intermediate inputs, (ii)
a change in profits. The latter may be either positive or negative: on
the one hand, a decrease in the dcni increases outsourcing, which in-
creases the amount of profits made; on the other hand, the profit
share decreases as the amount of underproduction declines. Table 9
shows that the latter effect dominates for most countries.
How important are frictions in sourcing services inputs relative to
physical inputs? Column 4 of Table 9 shows the fraction of the wel-
fare gain that is explained by a reduction in frictions associated with
physical inputs (agriculture, mining, manufacturing), assuming that
the sourcing of services inputs is not subject to frictions. By consid-
ering contracting frictions for physical inputs only, one would miss
roughly half of the welfare loss. In developing countries, the fric-
tions on physical inputs are more important, mainly because phys-
ical goods are a larger part of the household’s consumption basket.
In OECD economies, they account for less than 38 percent of the wel-
fare gains (see Table 10).
Since the Broda-Weinstein elasticities imply very high profit shares
(around 20-30%), I also show the welfare results when the profit
shares Πni/Xni are set to 5%, which roughly corresponds to the frac-
tion of pre-tax corporate profits in US gross output.43 Columns four
and five of Table 9 show the results. The welfare gains from a reduc-
tion in enforcement costs are higher than before, since holding the
profit shares constant eliminates the profits-reducing effect from a re-
duction in enforcement costs. Profits now unambiguously increase as
firms outsource more.
The last two columns of Table 9 show the counterfactual welfare
gains using the estimates resulting from my alternative measure of
43 Data from the NIPA, Bureau of Economic Analysis, for the years 1998 to 2009. Note
that this is not a direct calibration of the infrasectoral elasticities of substitution σn,
but rather a calibration of Πni/Xni which, according to the model, depends on the
σn. This is also why the consumer price level changes in Table 9 are the same in
the variable and fixed profit share columns: the σn enter the price level calculation
only through the terms in the square brackets in equation (19), which are directly
estimated from the data.
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relationship-specificity, ω(2)ni . The estimated elasticity of substitution
between input baskets, ρ, is lower, thus firms are less able to sub-
stitute away when contracting frictions are large for one particular
input. The resulting counterfactual welfare gains are therefore larger
than in the baseline estimates.
To understand how much inter-firm transaction costs in the form
of contracting frictions matter for the aggregate economy, I perform
a second counterfactual, where I set the enforcement costs to zero
and thereby eliminate contracting frictions altogether. The results are
in Table 11. The average increase in real income is around 7 per-
cent across all countries and 13.3 percent across low-income countries.
Hence, the aggregate effects of distortions to the firm boundaries that
originate from transaction costs are sizable, confirming North’s (1990)
hypothesis.
1.5 conclusion
This paper has studied the importance of contracting frictions for
the firm’s outsourcing decision, and estimated the associated loss in
aggregate productivity. The existing literature typically models con-
tracting frictions through incomplete contracts. However, there is lit-
tle evidence that judicial systems across countries differ in the degree
of contractual incompleteness. In this paper I have thus considered
a dimension along which we know that countries differ – the cost of
contract enforcement. I have developed a rich yet tractable model to
explain how costly contract enforcement increases the effective cost
of intermediate inputs, and how this leads to too much in-house pro-
duction. Using a novel measure of relationship-specificity constructed
from microdata on US case law, I have shown that in countries where
enforcement costs are high, firms tend to produce inputs that are
very relationship-specific within the firm boundaries. I have then es-
timated my model parameters and quantified the welfare loss from
costly enforcement.
What have we learned? First, contracting frictions distort the prices
of externally sourced inputs, particularly those that are relationship-
specific, leading to a reduction in the amount of outsourcing. The
welfare effects are large. Thus, I have shown that transaction costs
and the boundaries of the firm matter on a macroeconomic scale. The
welfare effects exceed the gains from trade for many countries. While
the literature on contracting frictions in international trade has shed
much light on the role of contracting frictions in shaping input use, it
is bound to miss the bulk of the distortions for two reasons. First, any
barriers to international trade (such as contracting frictions) can only
have welfare effects up to the gains of moving from autarky to free
trade. Therefore, the welfare effects of international contracting fric-
tions must be second-order. Second, contracting frictions are particu-
larly important for relationship-specific goods, in particular services.
These are mostly traded within the economy boundaries.
1.5 conclusion 37
A second lesson is that economists should take care when interpret-
ing input-output tables. Rather than being merely matrices of ’techno-
logical coefficients’, they contain information on the firm’s sourcing
decisions and thus reflect the country’s institutions and endowments.
My paper also shows the shortcoming of using the United States’
input-output table as a proxy for sectoral linkages in other countries,
since input-output tables vary significantly and systematically across
countries.
The third lesson is one for policy. My paper highlights the impor-
tance of judicial reform: the welfare costs from costly contract enforce-
ment are substantial, and must not be ignored. A good rule of thumb
to assess the magnitude of the welfare loss due to costly contract en-
forcement is that every percentage point in the cost of enforcement
decreases welfare by 0.32 percent. Judicial reforms must weigh the
benefits against the costs. They may be targeted to reduce the costs
of legal representation, such as in the case of the United Kingdom
(Jackson, 2009b), or attempt to clear the backlog of cases and speed
up the litigation and enforcement process.
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Table 9: Welfare gains from setting supplier contracting frictions to US levels
Using relationship-specificity ω(1)ni Using ω
(2)
ni
Variable Profit Shares Fixed Profit Shares Variable Profit Shares
δ ∆y, in % ∆P, in % % due to phys. inputs† ∆y, in % ∆P, in % ∆y, in % ∆P, in %
Albania 0.42 4.04 -8.79 43.6 9.87 -8.79 5.17 -9.74
Argentina 0.21 0.74 -0.95 37.6 1.03 -0.95 0.99 -1.22
Armenia 0.21 0.83 -1.18 67.9 1.27 -1.18 1.22 -1.56
Australia 0.24 1.46 -1.98 32.4 2.15 -1.98 2.02 -2.53
Austria 0.16 -0.15 0.22 29.6 -0.23 0.22 -0.26 0.30
Azerbaijan 0.21 0.47 -0.58 66.6 0.63 -0.58 0.62 -0.77
Bahrain 0.20 0.38 -0.34 35.2 0.38 -0.34 0.63 -0.53
Bangladesh 0.75 16.55 -18.14 82.7 23.10 -18.14 15.49 -16.96
Belarus 0.19 0.32 -0.46 84.2 0.49 -0.46 0.43 -0.57
Belgium 0.22 1.10 -1.60 35.5 1.73 -1.60 1.81 -2.09
Bolivia 0.38 3.28 -5.55 55.5 6.10 -5.55 4.08 -6.59
Botswana 0.36 2.34 -3.64 44.7 3.94 -3.64 3.01 -4.34
Brasil 0.23 0.77 -1.07 45.6 1.14 -1.07 1.03 -1.40
Bulgaria 0.28 2.11 -2.92 46.4 3.18 -2.92 2.96 -3.70
Cambodia 1.00 24.61 -20.94 76.6 28.11 -20.94 70.22 -35.84
Cameroon 0.53 7.81 -13.03 60.5 15.47 -13.03 11.37 -15.77
Canada 0.27 2.64 -3.30 33.8 3.66 -3.30 3.83 -4.32
Chile 0.33 5.00 -5.45 24.7 6.31 -5.45 10.87 -8.25
China PR 0.14 -0.37 0.53 72.1 -0.56 0.53 -0.52 0.67
Colombia 0.59 10.79 -11.75 40.3 14.14 -11.75 13.36 -14.03
Costa Rica 0.32 1.62 -2.37 57.0 2.54 -2.37 2.02 -2.79
Cote dIvoire 0.48 5.26 -9.19 88.4 10.35 -9.19 6.15 -10.11
Croatia 0.18 0.34 -0.38 62.9 0.42 -0.38 0.48 -0.52
Cyprus 0.22 0.89 -1.12 48.6 1.21 -1.12 1.12 -1.32
Czech Republic 0.39 7.73 -7.81 53.6 9.22 -7.81 13.90 -11.21
Denmark 0.28 2.16 -3.17 34.0 3.45 -3.17 3.18 -3.93
Ecuador 0.32 2.45 -3.17 62.8 3.46 -3.17 3.24 -4.03
Egypt 0.35 2.01 -2.53 75.3 2.75 -2.53 2.55 -3.28
El Salvador 0.26 1.27 -1.83 66.9 1.96 -1.83 1.57 -2.19
Estonia 0.18 0.28 -0.45 45.9 0.47 -0.45 0.44 -0.57
Ethiopia 0.21 0.48 -1.08 87.7 1.12 -1.08 0.61 -1.27
Finland 0.15 -0.23 0.46 44.1 -0.47 0.46 -0.33 0.55
France 0.20 0.55 -0.87 35.1 0.93 -0.87 0.84 -1.10
Georgia 0.44 3.75 -7.38 74.3 8.12 -7.38 4.15 -7.82
Germany 0.18 0.15 -0.24 32.6 0.25 -0.24 0.22 -0.30
Ghana 0.28 1.92 -3.54 68.1 3.81 -3.54 2.61 -3.89
Greece 0.21 0.52 -0.67 44.8 0.72 -0.67 0.69 -0.87
Guatemala 0.38 4.14 -6.36 62.5 7.08 -6.36 5.46 -7.67
Honduras 0.43 5.38 -6.13 54.2 6.98 -6.13 7.11 -7.33
Hong Kong 0.23 2.00 -2.87 48.5 3.13 -2.87 3.78 -3.92
mean 0.33 3.58 -4.12 53.2 4.92 -4.12 5.44 -5.18
Continued on the next page
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Table 9: Welfare gains from setting supplier contracting frictions to US levels (ctd.)
Using relationship-specificity ω(1)ni Using ω
(2)
ni
Variable Profit Shares Fixed Profit Shares Variable Profit Shares
δ ∆y, in % ∆P, in % % due to phys. inputs† ∆y, in % ∆P, in % ∆y, in % ∆P, in %
Hungary 0.18 0.16 -0.22 47.3 0.23 -0.22 0.24 -0.28
India 0.51 8.82 -11.14 62.2 13.11 -11.14 11.12 -12.49
Indonesia 1.00 41.64 -23.51 58.5 34.21 -23.51 76.09 -34.74
Iran 0.21 0.61 -0.85 56.5 0.91 -0.85 0.76 -1.04
Ireland 0.31 5.01 -5.74 36.8 6.60 -5.74 8.13 -7.40
Israel 0.33 4.74 -3.57 39.5 4.24 -3.57 10.86 -6.54
Italy 0.41 6.26 -7.23 39.0 8.33 -7.23 9.62 -9.40
Japan 0.35 4.14 -4.87 39.5 5.48 -4.87 5.66 -6.29
Kazakhstan 0.25 1.14 -1.09 63.9 1.21 -1.09 1.95 -1.64
Kenya 0.38 2.86 -2.48 83.6 2.80 -2.48 3.73 -3.74
Kuwait 0.23 0.92 -0.98 27.9 1.07 -0.98 1.44 -1.41
Kyrgyzstan 0.31 1.92 -3.66 60.9 3.90 -3.66 2.48 -4.16
Laos 0.35 1.76 -3.91 83.6 4.12 -3.91 2.00 -4.14
Latvia 0.19 0.32 -0.41 61.1 0.44 -0.41 0.48 -0.55
Lithuania 0.25 1.42 -2.11 41.9 2.28 -2.11 1.90 -2.64
Luxembourg 0.11 -1.09 1.71 27.3 -1.78 1.71 -1.68 2.26
Madagascar 0.50 6.73 -7.27 93.4 8.28 -7.27 6.63 -7.53
Malawi 1.00 25.84 -24.54 66.3 34.05 -24.54 30.36 -26.68
Malaysia 0.32 7.95 -6.66 41.5 8.07 -6.66 20.17 -12.01
Malta 0.40 4.71 -4.72 66.4 5.37 -4.72 6.42 -5.86
Mauritius 0.24 1.01 -1.32 55.9 1.42 -1.32 1.29 -1.55
Mexico 0.35 3.02 -5.71 37.8 6.26 -5.71 4.53 -7.30
Mongolia 0.33 2.10 -3.00 30.5 3.24 -3.00 3.00 -3.74
Morocco 0.29 2.94 -3.68 58.0 4.08 -3.68 4.10 -4.65
Mozambique 1.00 25.41 -28.67 54.0 41.47 -28.67 27.88 -29.96
Namibia 0.38 1.97 -2.49 56.2 2.70 -2.49 2.92 -3.37
Nepal 0.35 3.62 -3.88 77.9 4.31 -3.88 4.68 -6.46
Netherlands 0.29 2.03 -3.06 28.2 3.33 -3.06 2.93 -3.79
New Zealand 0.24 1.70 -2.19 35.0 2.40 -2.19 2.69 -3.00
Nicaragua 0.31 1.87 -3.46 58.0 3.70 -3.46 2.23 -4.04
Nigeria 0.38 3.41 -5.98 73.9 6.53 -5.98 3.37 -6.30
Norway 0.12 -0.74 1.60 36.2 -1.63 1.60 -1.08 1.89
Oman 0.18 0.15 -0.15 43.9 0.17 -0.15 0.24 -0.24
Pakistan 0.31 2.66 -4.15 70.7 4.50 -4.15 3.33 -4.79
Panama 0.56 7.07 -8.79 39.2 10.14 -8.79 9.00 -10.56
Paraguay 0.35 2.07 -3.61 79.7 3.86 -3.61 2.56 -4.45
Peru 0.40 3.95 -4.07 69.1 4.55 -4.07 5.20 -5.31
Philippines 0.32 2.88 -3.89 68.2 4.27 -3.89 4.23 -4.96
Poland 0.20 0.65 -0.98 46.2 1.05 -0.98 0.93 -1.23
Portugal 0.19 0.46 -0.54 49.5 0.59 -0.54 0.79 -0.77
Qatar 0.26 1.19 -1.09 39.0 1.22 -1.09 1.97 -1.73
mean 0.33 3.58 -4.12 53.2 4.92 -4.12 5.44 -5.18
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Table 9: Welfare gains from setting supplier contracting frictions to US levels (ctd.)
Using relationship-specificity ω(1)ni Using ω
(2)
ni
Variable Profit Shares Fixed Profit Shares Variable Profit Shares
δ ∆y, in % ∆P, in % % due to phys. inputs† ∆y, in % ∆P, in % ∆y, in % ∆P, in %
Romania 0.24 1.33 -2.60 67.8 2.76 -2.60 1.77 -3.05
Russia 0.16 -0.20 0.28 48.7 -0.30 0.28 -0.25 0.35
Saudi Arabia 0.33 1.67 -1.55 36.9 1.74 -1.55 2.55 -2.30
Senegal 0.33 1.76 -3.11 61.0 3.30 -3.11 2.11 -3.53
Singapore 0.19 0.93 -0.89 45.3 1.00 -0.89 2.06 -1.54
Slovakia 0.30 3.37 -4.04 48.9 4.52 -4.04 5.53 -5.48
Slovenia 0.32 3.84 -5.97 42.4 6.68 -5.97 5.77 -7.27
South Africa 0.38 4.47 -5.49 38.1 6.18 -5.49 6.79 -7.24
South Korea 0.12 -0.84 0.94 44.7 -1.02 0.94 -1.31 1.35
Spain 0.21 0.65 -0.90 36.6 0.97 -0.90 0.94 -1.15
Sri Lanka 0.34 4.15 -4.01 60.9 4.54 -4.01 5.04 -5.00
Sweden 0.35 3.52 -5.59 43.6 6.17 -5.59 5.01 -6.68
Switzerland 0.25 2.39 -2.27 25.2 2.58 -2.27 4.08 -3.43
Taiwan 0.22 1.08 -1.28 49.2 1.40 -1.28 1.66 -1.76
Tanzania 0.18 0.13 -0.33 70.8 0.34 -0.33 0.18 -0.39
Thailand 0.18 0.31 -0.46 65.7 0.48 -0.46 0.47 -0.58
Tunisia 0.26 2.80 -3.42 72.2 3.76 -3.42 4.49 -4.51
Turkey 0.31 2.62 -2.90 53.4 3.21 -2.90 3.33 -3.72
Uganda 0.49 8.44 -8.76 61.0 10.30 -8.76 12.63 -11.74
Ukraine 0.44 3.48 -3.47 45.9 3.86 -3.47 5.01 -4.83
United Arab Emirates 0.31 2.45 -2.02 42.5 2.31 -2.02 4.16 -3.20
United Kingdom 0.25 1.25 -1.73 28.1 1.87 -1.73 1.86 -2.22
United States 0.17 0.00 0.00 – 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Uruguay 0.25 1.18 -1.90 33.4 2.03 -1.90 1.76 -2.38
Venezuela 0.48 6.94 -8.15 52.8 9.42 -8.15 10.01 -10.83
Vietnam 0.34 4.21 -5.53 76.7 6.18 -5.53 6.20 -7.05
Zambia 0.43 4.42 -7.66 64.0 8.54 -7.66 5.80 -8.63
Zimbabwe 0.35 1.69 -2.36 61.1 2.52 -2.36 2.16 -2.88
mean 0.33 3.58 -4.12 53.2 4.92 -4.12 5.44 -5.18
†‘Percentage due to physical inputs’ is the fraction of the change in real income (column 2) that is explained through frictions
associated with physical inputs, i.e. agricultural, mining, and manufacturing products.
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Table 10: Welfare gains from setting contracting frictions to US levels: Averages
Using relationship-specificity ω(1)ni Using ω
(2)
ni
Variable Profit Shares Fixed Profit Shares Variable Profit Shares
δ ∆y, in % ∆P, in % % due to phys. inputs† ∆y, in % ∆P, in % ∆y, in % ∆P, in %
High income: OECD 0.24 1.95 -2.31 37.7 2.62 -2.31 3.26 -3.12
High income: non-OECD 0.24 1.21 -1.34 45.7 1.49 -1.34 1.90 -1.85
Upper middle income 0.31 2.72 -3.44 54.5 3.89 -3.44 4.05 -4.42
Lower middle income 0.39 4.95 -5.87 65.0 6.88 -5.87 7.30 -7.18
Low income 0.54 9.86 -10.18 73.0 13.36 -10.18 14.75 -12.30
Africa 0.42 5.41 -6.69 66.4 8.27 -6.69 6.70 -7.68
Northern Africa 0.30 2.58 -3.21 68.5 3.53 -3.21 3.71 -4.15
Eastern Africa 0.48 7.70 -8.45 69.8 11.08 -8.45 9.13 -9.44
Middle Africa 0.53 7.81 -13.03 60.5 15.47 -13.03 11.37 -15.77
Western Africa 0.37 3.09 -5.46 72.8 6.00 -5.46 3.56 -5.96
Southern Africa 0.37 2.92 -3.87 46.3 4.28 -3.87 4.24 -4.98
Americas 0.35 3.38 -4.40 50.6 4.97 -4.40 4.68 -5.51
Northern America 0.22 1.32 -1.65 33.8 1.83 -1.65 1.92 -2.16
Central America 0.37 3.48 -4.95 53.7 5.52 -4.95 4.56 -5.98
South America 0.35 3.72 -4.57 50.1 5.21 -4.57 5.31 -5.85
Asia 0.33 4.47 -4.30 56.2 5.27 -4.30 7.97 -5.83
Western Asia 0.27 1.67 -1.90 48.0 2.13 -1.90 2.69 -2.60
Central Asia 0.28 1.53 -2.37 62.4 2.55 -2.37 2.21 -2.90
Eastern Asia 0.23 1.35 -1.76 47.4 1.94 -1.76 2.05 -2.28
South-Eastern Asia 0.46 10.54 -8.22 64.5 10.81 -8.22 22.68 -12.61
Southern Asia 0.41 6.07 -7.03 68.5 8.41 -7.03 6.74 -7.79
Europe 0.25 1.75 -2.26 44.2 2.54 -2.26 2.66 -2.89
Northern Europe 0.23 1.44 -1.91 41.3 2.13 -1.91 2.18 -2.40
Western Europe 0.20 0.71 -0.87 30.5 0.97 -0.87 1.13 -1.16
Eastern Europe 0.27 2.11 -2.47 54.3 2.78 -2.47 3.39 -3.33
Southern Europe 0.29 2.60 -3.65 48.1 4.12 -3.65 3.73 -4.45
Oceania 0.24 1.58 -2.08 33.7 2.27 -2.08 2.35 -2.76
Note: Table shows the average counterfactual welfare changes when enforcement costs are set to US levels (17%). Income groups
are from the July 2013 World Bank income classifications; Regions are defined according to the UN geographical classification.
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Table 11: Welfare gains from eliminating supplier contracting frictions: Averages
Using relationship-specificity ω(1)ni Using ω
(2)
ni
Variable Profit Shares Fixed Profit Shares Variable Profit Shares
δ ∆y, in % ∆P, in % % due to phys. inputs† ∆y, in % ∆P, in % ∆y, in % ∆P, in %
All Countries 0.33 7.03 -8.51 53.14 10.46 -8.51 11.35 -10.77
High income: OECD 0.24 5.86 -7.26 38.0 8.60 -7.26 10.07 -9.64
High income: non-OECD 0.24 4.60 -5.20 46.0 6.07 -5.20 7.78 -7.18
Upper middle income 0.31 5.89 -7.56 55.0 8.96 -7.56 9.45 -9.66
Lower middle income 0.39 8.15 -10.28 64.5 12.62 -10.28 12.23 -12.36
Low income 0.54 13.37 -14.41 72.6 19.73 -14.41 21.58 -17.47
Africa 0.42 8.34 -10.90 66.1 13.90 -10.90 10.72 -12.61
Northern Africa 0.30 6.31 -7.79 68.5 9.10 -7.79 9.37 -9.93
Eastern Africa 0.48 10.79 -12.56 69.4 17.01 -12.56 13.18 -14.16
Middle Africa 0.53 11.06 -18.63 58.8 23.75 -18.63 16.68 -22.53
Western Africa 0.37 5.33 -9.95 72.0 11.50 -9.95 6.31 -10.89
Southern Africa 0.37 5.29 -7.15 46.9 8.26 -7.15 7.75 -9.09
Americas 0.35 6.38 -8.59 50.0 10.16 -8.59 9.27 -10.72
Northern America 0.22 5.07 -6.58 36.6 7.65 -6.58 7.57 -8.53
Central America 0.37 6.08 -8.99 53.1 10.52 -8.99 8.08 -10.79
South America 0.35 6.86 -8.72 50.5 10.42 -8.72 10.45 -11.12
Asia 0.33 8.49 -8.57 56.2 10.87 -8.57 16.30 -11.64
Western Asia 0.27 4.42 -4.99 48.2 5.81 -4.99 7.49 -6.86
Central Asia 0.28 3.79 -5.74 62.4 6.48 -5.74 5.77 -7.07
Eastern Asia 0.23 4.93 -6.37 47.5 7.42 -6.37 7.95 -8.33
South-Eastern Asia 0.46 17.53 -14.11 64.2 19.48 -14.11 42.33 -21.40
Southern Asia 0.41 9.69 -11.49 68.5 14.41 -11.49 11.07 -13.00
Europe 0.25 5.18 -6.96 44.7 8.15 -6.96 8.03 -8.82
Northern Europe 0.23 4.74 -6.77 41.8 7.87 -6.77 7.27 -8.40
Western Europe 0.20 4.24 -5.70 30.8 6.54 -5.70 6.87 -7.52
Eastern Europe 0.26 5.58 -7.05 54.8 8.30 -7.05 8.87 -9.11
Southern Europe 0.29 6.07 -8.17 48.7 9.72 -8.17 8.97 -10.08
Oceania 0.24 5.42 -7.25 34.2 8.40 -7.25 8.23 -9.40
Note: Table shows the average counterfactual welfare changes when enforcement costs (and hence contracting frictions) are
eliminated altogether. Income groups are from the July 2013 World Bank income classifications; Regions are defined according
to the UN geographical classification.
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A N D M I S A L L O C AT I O N A C R O S S C O U N T R I E S
2.1 introduction
The presence of bureaucratic barriers to starting businesses is often
considered to be one of the main culprits of underdevelopment in
poor countries, and has hence featured prominently on the develop-
ment policy agenda. However, showing a causal link between entry
barriers and development is far from easy due to the presence of con-
founding factors, the difficulty of measurement, and the possibility
of reverse causality.
The present paper investigates the quantitative importance of sev-
eral different channels through which bureaucratic startup costs may
affect aggregate outcomes. We study a dynamic model of occupa-
tional choice, intergenerational inheritance of wealth and managerial
talent, and decreasing returns to scale at the level of the production
unit. Agents live for one period and are heterogeneous in wealth and
managerial talent. At the beginning of each period, they face a deci-
sion about whether to become an entrepreneur, in which case they re-
ceive the profits from running a firm, or to work on the labor market,
thus earning a wage. Entrepreneurs borrow to cover a fixed bureau-
cratic startup cost and factor payments, but the option to default and
limits to asset recovery mean that they face an endogenous borrow-
ing constraint. Hence, their return from operating a firm depends not
only on their managerial talent, but also on their ability to scale up
production. On the aggregate scale, outcomes are the result of three
forces: (i) the allocation of capital among existing firms, (ii) the se-
lection of agents of different managerial talent into entrepreneurship,
and (iii) the distortion of the average scale of production from the
optimal level in the presence of decreasing returns to scale.
To understand the quantitative importance of these mechanisms,
we calibrate the model economy to match several key moments of
the US data, and set the institutional parameters to values observed
in the World Bank’s Doing Business survey of business regulations
across countries. We show that the net effect of abolishing bureau-
cratic startup costs is small; it would only increase income per capita
on average by 1% across the countries in our sample, and at most by
6%. On the other hand, the importance of access to external financ-
ing seems to be much higher; countries that move from no external
financing to unconstrained access to capital would experience an in-
crease in income per capita of more than 35% – this also being the
corresponding counterfactual for some of the countries in our sam-
ple.
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Our result that bureaucratic startup costs have a small net effect
comes from the fact that their effects go in opposite directions, and
hence partially offset each other. Higher startup costs increase the
entry cutoff for managerial talent and wealth. Since the correlation
of wealth and talent increases for higher levels of wealth and tal-
ent, selection becomes better. On the other hand, higher startup costs
decrease the mass of firms, thus the average scale of production is
too high, and output per capita decreases. The latter effect is slightly
stronger than the former, hence the negative net effect on welfare. The
bureaucratic startup costs also interact with the financial frictions by
changing the allocation of capital to firms, though the magnitude of
this effect is rather small.
2.1.1 Related Literature
There is an extensive literature on the effects of startup costs and fi-
nancial frictions on misallocation and aggregate productivity.1 Moscoso
Boedo and Mukoyama (2012) and Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011)
study the effects of bureaucratic startup costs on Total Factor Produc-
tivity (TFP) using a dynamic model. Startup costs result in lower TFP
due to the Hopenhayn-Melitz selection mechanism: lower sunk costs
lead to a larger mass of entrants, thus higher labor demand, higher
wage, and hence a higher productivity cutoff with more firms exiting
(stronger selection). Their mechanism requires that agents have no
knowledge of their entrepreneurial ability when they face the entry
decision. Given our emphasis on generational talent shocks, this is
unlikely to be of relevance in our situation. If and entrepreneur en-
ters, tries out for one or two years, and subsequently decides to exit
and work, we would count him as a worker in the first place. Given
that young firms tend to be small and account for only a small frac-
tion of output, the mistake that we making by taking these firms not
into account is small.
Startup costs may affect misallocation through competition and
changes in markups. However, Peters (2013) finds that the static ef-
fects on misallocation are fairly small (decreases TFP by roughly 1%).
We thus abstract from the effects of market structure on misallocation
in this paper.
Our work is also strongly related to a large literature that studies
the effect of financial frictions on aggregate outcomes (among oth-
ers, Amaral and Quintin, 2010, Jeong and Townsend, 2007, Buera and
Shin, 2013, Caselli and Gennaioli, 2013, Midrigan and Xu, 2014). Per-
haps the most closely related paper is Buera et al. (2011), who empha-
size the complementarity between fixed costs and financial frictions
for selection into entrepreneurship and TFP loss. However, their fixed
costs are largely production infrastructure, and not institutional fea-
tures, and may therefore vary not much across countries. Our bureau-
cratic startup costs are magnitudes smaller, hence our finding of their
limited quantiative importance.
1 See Hopenhayn (2014) for a survey.
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2.2 model
2.2.1 Preferences and Endowments
We study a model of occupational choice in the spirit of Lucas (1978),
with intergenerational transmission of managerial talent and dynas-
tic misallocation as in Caselli and Gennaioli (2013). The economy is
populated by a unit continuum of individuals, who each live for one
period and each have exactly one child. They choose consumption
cit and bequests bit to maximize utility over consumption and the
child’s future income yit+1,
max
cit,bit
log cit +β logyit+1(bit)
subject to a budget constraint
cit + bit 6 yit.
and the constraint that bequests have to be nonnegative, bit > 0.
Agents are endowed with one unit of time, which they can either
spend by inelastically supplying it on the labor market, or by operat-
ing a firm, which we explain below.
Agents vary in their entrepreneurial talent θit. We assume that θit
follows a random growth process,
θit+1 = qγit+1θit + 1 (23)
where q < 1 and the growth rate γit+1 follows a lognormal distribu-
tion and is i.i.d. across individuals i and time t.
logγit+1 ∼ N
(
0,σ2
)
, σ > 0.
Equation (23) captures the idea that managerial talent may be pos-
itively correlated across generations. The parameter q governs the
persistence of talent, wheas σ affects the variance of talent shocks.
Our choice of the talent process is guided by the asymptotic proper-
ties of the talent distribution. Appendix B shows that the tail of the
steady state distribution of talent θ follows a power law.2 Gabaix and
Landier (2008) argue that a distribution of managerial talent that has
approximately power law tails is necessary to explain the distribution
of CEO compensation and firm size in the US.3 We assume that the
parent spends enough time with the child to know its entrepreneurial
talent θit+1.
2 The result that the stationary distribution associated with equation (23) is asymp-
totically Pareto in the tail does not rest on the distributional assumptions regarding
γit+1. Indeed, this is true for much more general processes. See Gabaix (2009) for a
discussion, and Kesten (1973) for proofs.
3 Buera et al. (2011) and Hsieh et al. (2013) obtain power law tails for the talent dis-
tribution by making the assumption that the cross-section of talent at any point in
time follows a Pareto distribution. Our modeling strategy of using random growth
processes has the advantage that it replicates the concavity of the empirical estab-
lishment size distribution; see Section 2.3.1.
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2.2.2 Technology and Financial Frictions
At the beginning of each period, each individual decides whether to
become a manager/entrepreneur4 or a worker. If they decide to be-
come a manager, they have to obtain a license to operate a firm. They
can pay κ in administrative fees to create a new license, or buy one
from an existing owner at price p, both in units of the output good.5
The parameter κ are the administrative costs faced by the entrant,
and is hence one of our key parameters of institutional quality in this
paper.
Once the entrepreneurs have acquired a license, they face a fixed
cost of f units of the output good, and subsequently produce using a
technology that is Cobb-Douglas in capital and labor. The managerial
talent of the entrepreneur, θit, determines firm-level TFP.
Yit(θit) = θit
(
Kαi L
1−α
i
)ρ
. (24)
Following Lucas (1978), we assume ρ < 1, thus the production tech-
nology exhibits decreasing returns to scale. Capital fully depreciates
after production takes place. Output, the consumption good, is per-
fectly storable and transformable into capital. We take the output
good as the numeraire. With probability δ a license/firm is destroyed
at the end of the period. If the license is not destroyed, it is be-
queathed to the son.6 To keep the household’s problem a determinis-
tic one, we assume that the realization of the firm destruction shock
is known at the time the decision is made.
We model financial frictions as limits to the enforcement of lend-
ing contracts. The entrepreneurs may borrow and lend capital at a
fixed interest factor R > 1. After production takes place and wages
are paid, but before agents consume, the entrepreneurs may default
on their loans. If that happens, the lenders can seize a fraction φ
of the entrepreneur’s assets. The debtor keeps the remaining share
1−φ. The possibility of default means that lenders limit the amount
they are willing to lend. This gives rise to a borrowing constraint that
depends on the net worth of the entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurs receive the revenue from production net of factor
payments, hence their income is
y
entrepreneur
it ≡ Yit(θit) −wLit − R (Kit − (bit−1 −min{p, κ}− f)) .
The non-default constraint ensures that the debt does not exceed the
amount that lenders could recover:
R (K− (bit −min(κ,p) − f)) 6 φ (Yit(θit) −wLit) (25)
4 We will use these two terms interchangeably. See Caselli and Gennaioli (2012) for a
discussion of delegated control in this setting.
5 The third way to obtain a license would be to inherit it. However, given that the
market for licenses is frictionless, we do not distinguish between inheriting a license
and inheriting p.
6 For the sake of brevity we include the value of a licence p in the bequest bit when-
ever the son inherits the licence.
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Alternatively, agents may become workers instead of entrepreneurs,
in which case they supply their unit labor endowment on the Wal-
rasian labor market and receive a wage w. Naturally, if a son inher-
its a licence but decides to become a worker, he sells the licence. A
worker’s total income consists of labor and capital income, the lat-
ter being the gross return from lending their bequest (including the
revenue from selling the licence, if applicable) on the capital markets,
yworkerit (θit) = wt + Rbit−1.
2.2.3 Equilibrium
We focus on steady state equilibria, where individuals choose con-
sumption, bequests, and occupation to maximize utility; firms choose
capital and labor to maximize profits; the goods market, labor market,
and the market for licences clear; the aggregate variables are constant,
and the wealth and ownership distributions are time-invariant.
2.2.3.1 The Firm’s Decision
Entrepreneurs maximize revenue minus factor payments. The labor
market is frictionless, thus the wage is equal to the marginal product
of labor. Hence, labor demand is
Ldi =
(
ρ (1−α) θi
w
) 1
1−ρ(1−α)
K
αρ
1−ρ(1−α)
i . (26)
We can then rewrite the entrepreneur’s profit as
y
entrepreneur
it = pi(θit)K
αρ
1−ρ(1−α)
i −R (Kit − (bit−1 −min{p, κ}− f)) (27)
where pi(θit) ≡ (1− ρ (1−α)) θ
1
1−ρ(1−α)
it (w/ρ (1−α))
ρ(1−α)
ρ(1−α)−1 . The first
term in (27) is revenue minus labor cost, which is concave due to the
presence of decreasing returns to scale. The entrepreneur chooses cap-
ital Kit optimally to maximize (27) subject to the borrowing constraint
(25). Given the decreasing returns to scale, it may be the case that the
optimal capital stock lies in the interior of the feasible set; hence, the
borrowing constraint may not be binding.
2.2.3.2 The Household’s Decision, and the Market for Licences
Since the agent’s occupation enters in his utility function only through
his income yit, we can split his utility maximization problem into
two stages: (i) maximize income yit over the occupation, (ii) max-
imize utility over consumption and bequest, taking the occupation
as given. The latter is the usual consumption-saving decision, and
does not require discussion. In the first stage, the agent will choose
entrepreneurship if and only if yentrepreneurit > yworkerit , or
pi(θit)K
αρ
1−ρ(1−α)
i − R (Kit +min{p, κ}+ f) > w. (28)
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The presence of the cost of acquiring a licence distorts the entry deci-
sion both directly in (28), and indirectly through the amount of capi-
tal that entrepreneurs can raise. Hence, it affects aggregate outcomes
through distorting the selection of agents into entrepreneurship, and,
to a much lesser extent, through the misallocation of capital.
Will the entrepreneur buy an existing license at cost p or pay κ to
create a new one? In steady state the market price p for a licence has
to equal the cost of setting up a new licence κ: if p < κ, agents would
only buy existing licences when setting up new firms, and given that
licences get destroyed at rate δ, it would mean that the number of
licences would not be constant. Conversely, if p > κ, demand for
existing licenses would be zero. Since there are always some licence
owners who want to sell their licence for any p > 0, markets would
not clear. Hence p = κ and in steady-state the entrepreneurs are in-
different between creating a new licence and purchasing an existing
one. The mass of newly created ones will equal the mass of firms that
are destroyed by the δ-shock in every period.
2.2.3.3 Extensive and intensive-margin distortions
How would the social planner’s solution in this economy look like?
Firstly, he would allocate capital among entrepreneurs as to equalize
their marginal product of capital. Secondly, he would want to select
the agents with the highest talent to become entrepreneurs. In an
economy with constant returns to scale, he would pick only the best
agent to operate one big firm. However, since our economy features
decreasing returns to scale at the firm level, he would prefer to pick
a positive mass of firms to operate, in order to decrease the average
scale of operations. It it thus reasonable to define and separate three
different margins of adjustment, all of which shape the performance
of this economy at the aggregate level: first, the mass of firms that are
operating, and hence the average scale of operating establishments,
second, the selection of agents into entrepreneurship, and third, the
allocation of capital among operating establishments.
The equilibrium is distorted by the presence of the two frictions.
Firstly, the possibility of default means that lenders will not lend
more than a certain amount. Thus, entrepreneurs with low levels of
net worth are constrained in the amount of capital that they can bor-
row. Hence, the marginal product of capital is not equalized, and
there is misallocation of capital among the operating firms. There is,
however, also an effect on selection: agents with low net worth are
not going to enter. This lowers the mass of firms and increases the
average scale of production, which in turn leads to lower output per
capita. The presence of bureaucratic startup costs distorts mostly the
ownership decision, and hence the affects output per capita to a large
extent through the selection and scale channels. It is with respect to
these three channels that we evaluate the quantitative impact of the
two frictions in Section 2.3.
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2.2.3.4 Two measures of aggregate productivity
Before proceeding to the quantitative exercise, we define some mea-
sures of aggregate productivity. In an economy that features decreas-
ing returns to scale on the firm level, it is not immediately clear which
measure of aggregate total factor productivity to use. We derive two
different measures: one which we believe to be close to what empiri-
cal researchers would use in a development accounting exercise, and
a second, which resembles more closely a weighted mean of firm-
level productivities.
Suppose agents had perfect access to credit markets, φ = 1, then
the firm’s optimal choice of capital would equalize the maginal prod-
uct of capital with the interest factor R. This implies, together with
the firm’s first-order condition for labor, that
Y =
∫
Yidi =
(
1
L
∫
θ
1
1−ρ
i di
)1−ρ
KαρL1−αρ (29)
where K ≡ ∫Kidi and L ≡ ∫ Lidi denote the aggregates of the factors.
Hence, one can define
TFPE ≡ Y
KαρL1−αρ
(30)
which corresponds to the definition of TFP in the most common form
of the development accounting exercise, where the exponent of the
capital stock is set to the capital share of production, and the expo-
nent of the labor share to one minus the capital share (Caselli, 2005).
Alternatively, one can write equation (29) as
Y =
(
1
M
∫
θ
1
1−ρ
i di
)1−ρ
M1−ρKαρLρ(1−α) (31)
where M denotes the measure of operating firms. The term
TFPM ≡ Y
M1−ρKαρLρ(1−α)
hence corresponds to a weighted mean of the operating firms’ pro-
ductivity levels, and is as such a reasonable measure of aggregate
productivity. Compared to the definition of TFP in (30), it corrects
for the efficiency gains that arise from operating the plants at a lower
scale when more firms are present. While equations (29) and (31) only
hold in a perfect-credit world, we use them to motivate the factor
shares in the definitions of TFPE and TFPM.
2.3 quantitative analysis
In this section, we use our model’s predictions to investigate the quan-
titative importance of barries to entry and financial market imper-
fections, which correspond to the parameters κ and φ respectively,
for aggregate productivity. We do this by calibrating our model of
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financial frictions and entry barriers to match moments from the US
data. We then study how misallocation changes when we set our two
key institutional parameters, the debt recovery parameter φ and en-
try costs κ, to values that we observe in countries across the world.
In performing this exercise, we are holding the distribution of en-
trepreneurial talent constant.
2.3.1 Calibration
We calibrate our model to match firm size and intergenerational statis-
tics from the United States. In total, we need to calibrate ten param-
eters: two talent parameters, q,σ, three technological parameters, α,
ρ, and f, two institutional parameters, φ and κ, the relative weight
on the child’s income in the utility function, β, the interest rate R,
and the firm destruction probability δ. We interpret one period in our
model as a span of 20 years.
For the institutional parameters φ and κ, we use data from the
World Bank’s Doing Business survey. The dataset contains a variable
that captures the percentage that creditors can retrieve from debtors
through reorganization, liquidation, or debt enforcement proceedings
in a standardised insolvency case (the ’recovery rate’); hence, it di-
rectly maps into the parameter φ in our model. The survey is de-
signed to make the results internationally comparable and the terms
of the insolvency case are the same across countries. The measure
takes into account the costs of insolvency proceedings and the pos-
sibility that business operations may be continued through debt re-
structuring.
We use the "cost of starting a new business" variable from the same
dataset to calibrate the cost of acquiring a new license κ in our model.
These costs are the official fees of setting up a limited liability com-
pany, or its equivalent, and include fees for legal and professional ser-
vices that are required by law. Again the costs refer to a benchmark
case, and, in the baseline specification, exclude the paid-in minimum
capital required by law. No bribes or side payments are recorded. The
survey states the startup cost as a fraction of the country’s income per
capita. Hence, we set the entry cost κ such that the model generates
a κ/Y that is equal to what we observe in the dataset. For both the re-
covery rate and the startup cost we use the time-averages by country
over the years 2009 to 2012, as this is where we have the largest sam-
ple of countries. Table 26 shows summary statistics and correlations
with income per capita for both institutional measures.
We calibrate the remaining parameters to jointly match statistics
on firm size and dynamics and intergenerational income dynamics
in the United States. We assume an annual interest rate of four per-
cent, hence R = 1.0420 ≈ 2.19. For the exit probability δ, we note that
the annual exit rates for establishments are roughly ten percent (Busi-
ness Dynamics Statistics, 2012), which means that the probability of
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Table 12: Summary statistics for institutional parameters
Quantiles
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 10% 50% 90%
Access to capital φ 0.33 0.24 0.00 0.93 0.02 0.30 0.73
Bureaucratic startup costs κ/Y 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.01 0.06
Source: Author’s calculations from World Bank Doing Business (2013)
surviving for 20 years is roughly (1 − 10/100)^20 ≈ 12, 1%. Hence,
δ = 0.88. The large firms in the economy, i.e. the right tail of the firm
size distribution, is key for overall labor demand and therefore the
wage. We thus calibrate our model economy to match the US employ-
ment share of the largest ten percent of establishments (69%, from the
US Small Business Administration). To get the intertemporal correla-
tion of talent right, we match the elasticity of a child’s lifetime income
with respect to the parents income of 0.3, as reported by Charles and
Hurst (2003). We calibrate β, the weight of the child’s income in the
parent’s utility function, to match the fraction of bequests in total life-
time wealth (0.34, from Gale and Scholz, 1994)7. We set α so as to
match the capital-output ratio (0.109 using data from Caselli, 2005), ρ
as to match the earnings share of the top 5 percent of earners (Buera
et al., 2011), and fixed costs f as to match the fraction of entrepreneurs
as implied by the mean firm size (19.93, from the US Census Bureau’s
Statistics of US Businesses). Table 13 summarizes parameters and tar-
gets.8
Table 13: Calibration targets
Target Moments Source US Data Model Parameter
Capital-output ratio Caselli (2005) 0.11 0.11 α = 0.325
Bequests in lifetime wealth Gale and Scholz (1994) 0.34 0.34 β = 0.66
Fraction of entrepreneurs US SUSB (2007) 0.05 0.05 f = 0.2
Top 10-percentile employment share US SBA (2007) 0.69 0.65 σ = 0.69
Top 5-percent earnings share Buera et al. (2011) 0.30 0.33 ρ = 0.735
Elasticity of child income Charles and Hurst (2003) 0.30 0.31 q = 0.334
Figure 4 shows the simulated size distribution of establishments
for the US case (κ/Y = 7× 10−4,φ = 0.791), together with percentiles
from the US data. For each establishment size, we compute the frac-
tion of establishments of greater or equal size. In the resulting plot
with log scales, a straight line would indicate a Pareto distribution of
establishment sizes. The fact that the establishment size distribution
features a slight concavity means that there are slightly fewer small
and large establishments than what would be indicated by a Pareto
7 (63.19+ 105.00+ 35.29) · 20/11976 = 0.3398.
8 Capital-output share: (k/y) /20 = 0.109 using data from Caselli (2005). Bequests in
lifetime wealth: from Gale and Scholz (1994), (63.19+ 105.00+ 35.29) · 20/11976 =
0.3398. Fraction of entrepreneurs implied by average firm size of 19.93 (SUSB 2007).
Elasticity of child income is the coefficient in a regression of log labor income of the
child’s family on log labor income of the parents, as reported by Charles and Hurst
(2003), Table 3.
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Figure 4: Size distribution: Model vs Data
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Note: Comparison of percentiles of the simulated establishment size distribution
with percentiles from the US establishment size distribution in 2000. US establish-
ment size data from Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007).
Figure 5: The Impact of Financial Frictions and Startup Costs on In-
come/Capita
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Note: Simulated output per capita, relative to the undistorted economy benchmark,
as a function of the recovery rate φ (left pane) and startup costs κ/Y (right panel).
Solid (dashed, dash-dotted) line denotes startup costs κ/Y (left panel) or financial
frictions φ (right panel) at the 10th (50th, 90th) percentile.
distribution. The model matches the observed US establishment size
distribution well, and even manages to replicate the observed concav-
ity in the data.9
2.3.2 The Impact of Startup Costs and Financial Frictions
We now turn to the quantitative evaluation of financial frictions and
startup costs, as described by the parameters φ and κ/Y, respectively.
We vary φ and κ/Y to span the full range of values observed in the
cross-country data, and simulate the key variables of interest in the
steady-state.
9 Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) explain the concavity using a theory of industry-
specific human capital. In our model, the concavity arises directly from the agent’s
talent distribution.
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Figure 6: Mass of operating firms as a function of φ and κ/Y
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Note: Mass of operating firms, as a function of the recovery rate φ (left pane) and
startup costs κ/Y (right panel). Solid (dashed, dash-dotted) line denotes startup costs
κ/Y (left panel) or financial frictions φ (right panel) at the 10th (50th, 90th) percentile.
The left panel of Figure 5 shows output per capita for the simulated
economies, relative to a frictionless benchmark (φ = 1, κ = 0), as a
function of credit market access φ. The three lines refer to startup
costs being set at the 10th (solid line), 50th (dashed line), and 90th
percentile (dash-dotted line). Moving from a perfect-credit world to
a world with no access to external financing decreases output per
capita by more than a quarter. The kink in the curve at around φ
equal to one half arises due of the presence of decreasing returns
to scale in production: for high values of φ, the firms are able to
operate their firms at the efficient scale, and the borrowing constraint
becomes non-binding. The lines referring to the three different levels
of startup costs almost overlap, showing that startup costs have a
very minor impact on welfare in this economy. This can be seen more
clearly in the right panel of Figure 5, which plots output per capita as
a function of the bureaucratic startup costs. Here, the solid, dashed,
and dash-dotted line correspond to output per capita when capital
market access φ is set to the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile. The slopes
of the three curves are only slightly negatively sloped, indicating that
startup costs distort the economy only in a very minor way. Note that
the slopes become steeper as financial frictions increase: startup costs
have more bite when access to credit is limited, since entrepreneurs
may need to borrow in order to finance the startup costs. The dots
in Figure 5 (and all subsequent figures) refer to the countries in our
sample.
Before turning to productivity, it is instructive to look at how the
frictions shape the mass of operating firms in the economy, and hence
the average firm size. Figure 6 shows the mass of firms as functions
of φ and κ/Y. Better access to credit increases the average firm size:
firms are able to scale up, which increases labor demand and raises
the wage. This, in turn, increases the talent cutoff for becoming an
entrepreneur. Higher startup costs increase selection and the average
firm size, with the effect being stronger for a higher degree of finan-
cial frictions. On a quantitative dimension, the cross-country variation
in φ explains roughly half of difference in average firm size across
countries (Poschke, 2014).
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Figure 7: TFPE as a function of φ and κ/Y
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Note: Aggregate productivity as measured by TFPE, as a function of the recovery
rate φ (left pane) and startup costs κ/Y (right panel). Solid (dashed, dash-dotted)
line denotes startup costs κ/Y (left panel) or financial frictions φ (right panel) at the
10th (50th, 90th) percentile.
Figure 8: TFPM as a function of φ and κ/Y
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
φ
TF
PM
 
 
low startup cost
medium startup cost
high startup cost
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
κ/Y
TF
PM
 
 
low phi
medium phi
high phi
Note: Aggregate productivity as measured by TFPM, as a function of the recovery
rate φ (left pane) and startup costs κ/Y (right panel). Solid (dashed, dash-dotted)
line denotes startup costs κ/Y (left panel) or financial frictions φ (right panel) at the
10th (50th, 90th) percentile.
Figures 7 and 8 show the two measures of aggregate productivity
as a function of φ and κ/Y. Better access to credit unambiguously
increases TFPM through the extensive-margin reallocation of firms to
the most productive agents, and intensive-margin reallocation of cap-
ital to equalize the marginal product of capital. As described above,
this also decreases the mass of firms that are operating in the econ-
omy; hence, firms are operating on a larger scale. Given the presence
of decreasing returns in the production technology, aggregate produc-
tivity as measured by TFPE is nonmonotonous in φ; only when one
corrects for the mass of firms (and hence the scale of production) it
becomes unambiguously increasing. These counteracting forces are
even clearer for the effects of startup costs, which operate mostly on
the extensive margin: as startup costs increase, the talent cutoffs shift
to the right, and fewer firms operate in the economy (Figure 6). The
operating firms are more productive, hence TFPM increases (Figure
8), but the average scale of operations increase, which decreases ag-
gregate productivity as measured by TFPE. The net effect on the wage
and output per capita is negative (Figure 5).
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Finally, we calculate the predicted changes in the aggregate vari-
ables when bureaucratic startup costs are abolished (κ = 0). Table 14
summarizes the results.
Table 14: Welfare gains from eliminating bureaucratic startup costs:
Averages
φ κ/Y, in % ∆Y, in % ∆TFPE, in % ∆TFPM, in %
All countries 33.2 2.1 1.05 0.75 -0.08
High income: OECD 66.0 0.3 0.64 0.48 0.52
High income: non-OECD 42.4 0.6 0.75 0.56 0.45
Low income 15.4 6.6 2.04 1.37 -1.35
Lower middle income 21.3 2.3 1.02 0.76 -0.20
Upper middle income 31.2 1.1 0.82 0.59 0.23
Africa 19.7 4.9 1.63 1.13 -0.90
Northern Africa 36.0 0.8 0.72 0.54 0.26
Eastern Africa 16.1 4.0 1.50 1.05 -0.57
Middle Africa 7.0 9.8 3.07 1.97 -1.96
Western Africa 18.4 5.6 1.55 1.10 -1.35
Southern Africa 41.6 0.9 0.66 0.51 0.23
Americas 32.8 1.8 0.94 0.69 -0.03
Northern America 84.5 0.0 0.63 0.45 0.63
Central America 37.3 2.1 0.83 0.67 -0.27
Caribbean 28.2 1.7 1.03 0.74 0.12
South America 25.8 1.9 0.96 0.69 -0.11
Asia 34.0 1.1 0.84 0.61 0.24
Western Asia 32.0 1.3 0.86 0.63 0.18
Central Asia 28.5 0.6 0.73 0.53 0.36
Eastern Asia 65.5 0.3 0.65 0.48 0.49
South-Eastern Asia 27.0 1.3 0.96 0.70 0.23
Southern Asia 27.3 1.2 0.83 0.61 0.16
Europe 50.9 0.3 0.65 0.48 0.50
Northern Europe 71.7 0.1 0.62 0.45 0.61
Western Europe 61.5 0.2 0.65 0.48 0.56
Eastern Europe 33.2 0.3 0.63 0.46 0.48
Southern Europe 42.2 0.6 0.69 0.54 0.40
Oceania 30.6 1.5 0.96 0.69 0.10
Australia and New Zealand 78.8 0.0 0.62 0.45 0.63
Melanesia 27.5 1.9 0.87 0.66 -0.20
Micronesia 15.0 2.4 1.29 0.90 0.01
Polynesia 20.0 0.7 0.80 0.55 0.34
Note: Table shows the average percentage change in income per capita, TFPE, and TFPM
(Columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively) when bureaucratic startup costs are lowered from the value
in Column 2 to zero, holding access to capital φ (Column 1) constant. Income groups are from
the July 2013 World Bank income classifications; Regions are defined according to the UN geo-
graphical classification.
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3.1 introduction
Multiproduct firms dominate production and export activity, and
their continual product turnover contributes substantially to aggre-
gate output growth. In the United States, multiproduct firms account
for over 90 per cent of manufacturing output and multiproduct ex-
porters account for over 95 per cent of exports. About 89 per cent
of multiproduct firms vary their product mix within five years and
these changes in the product mix make up a third of the increase in
US manufacturing output (see Bernard et al., 2007, 2010).
Adding or dropping a product is an important event for firms. For
US firms, product churning affected over a third of the firm’s prod-
ucts and output, on average. A growing literature shows firms con-
tinually adapt their product mix to focus on their core competencies
(Bernard et al. 2005, 2011; Eckel and Neary 2010; Mayer et al. 2014;
Iacovone and Javorcik 2010). Over time, firms tend to move towards
a few successful products, and focusing on these selected products
enables them to respond to changes in their economic environment.
While the literature explains the importance of core competencies,
it does not address the sources of firms’ core competencies. Under-
standing the sources of core competencies requires an examination of
product characteristics that determine which products firms add and
drop. This paper focuses on the role of input-output linkages in firms’
decisions to add and drop products.
A multiproduct firm can internalize the supply linkages across its
products. This implies firms would choose to focus on products that
have supply linkages to existing products. We examine the extent to
which supply linkages determine the products which are added and
dropped by firms. We address this for manufacturing establishments
in India. During the 2000s, manufacturing value added in India was
on the rise and product turnover contributed 28 per cent to net sales
growth. Indian firms actively changed their product mix, and we use
detailed survey data on the input and product mix of firms to study
the role of input linkages in product turnover. We find that input
linkages are an important determinant of the product mix of firms.
Controlling for firm-time, product-time and firm-product fixed ef-
fects, shocks to a firm’s input mix make the firm more likely to move
into products that require a similar mix of inputs. Quantitatively, a
one standard deviation rise in the correlation between a firm’s input
mix and the product’s input mix is associated with a 0.02 percentage
point rise in the probability of not dropping the product.
56
3.1 introduction 57
Our findings echo the results from previous work which suggests
that firms tend to add products that have supply linkages to their
core products. Studies in the business literature document firms are
more likely to add products that use similar technologies to the firm’s
main product, measured by the extent of commonality in patents
used across industries. Scherer (1982) estimated technology flows be-
tween industries from data on the proportion of patents filed in the
origin industry that were used in the destination industry and data
on interindustry economic transfers drawn from the input-output
tables. Using this measure of technological relatedness, Robins and
Wiersema (1995) show firm performance is positively related to tech-
nological relatedness, controlling for industry and firm characteris-
tics in a cross-section of 120 publicly listed US firms. Regressing
the relatedness measure on industry-level import penetration, Bowen
and Wiersema (2005) find a positive correlation between technolog-
ical relatedness of a firm’s products and import penetration in the
core product, after controlling for industry and firm characteristics of
publicly-listed US firms from 1985 to 1994.
Focusing on input relatedness, Fan and Lang (2000) construct mea-
sures for vertical relatedness and complementarity across industries
using the input output tables for US firms. Vertical relatedness refers
to the dollar amount of input transfer between industries and comple-
mentarity is captured by the degree of overlap in the industries’ input
and output markets. They find that the vertical relatedness and com-
plementarity of US firms’ products increased between 1979 to 1997,
but relatedness and complementarity were not always positively re-
lated to the valuation of firms.1 Liu (2010) embeds the relatedness
measures to determine the heterogeneous impact of import compe-
tition on various products within a multiproduct firm. For publicly-
listed US firms, import competition leads multiproduct firms to drop
peripheral products to refocus on core production. The weaker the
linkages that a peripheral product shares with the core (as measured
by the extent of joint sales, joint procurement, joint production, and
joint sectorship), the more likely it is for the peripheral product to be
dropped in response to import competition after controlling for in-
dustry and firm characteristics. Using a special survey of 108 leading
European manufacturers, Rondi and Vannoni (2005) find European
firms expanded their output of core industries after integration of the
European Union. Highly diversified firms were more likely to focus
on products that shared intermediate input and markets with their
core products.
We contribute to this literature in two ways. First, controlling for
a full set of firm-time and product-time fixed effects, we show the
positive relationship between a firm’s supply relatedness and prod-
uct additions is driven by firm’s ability to internalize supply linkages
across products. Second, we provide the first systematic study of sup-
ply linkages within multiproduct firms in the context of a developing
1 Using plant-level observations from the Longitudinal Research Database, Schoar
(2002) finds firms diversifying into more 2-digit SIC industries experience a net re-
duction in productivity.
3.2 product turnover among indian manufacturing firms 58
country. This is important because supply-side bottlenecks are partic-
ularly acute in developing countries (The World Bank, 2013), and we
provide estimates for the extent to which multiproduct firms are able
to overcome these bottlenecks by internalizing supply linkages.In re-
lated work, Aw and Lee (2009) focus on four industries within the Tai-
wanese electronics sector for which they have detailed data on firm
sales by products and on firm inputs. They estimate the firm’s cost
function to arrive at the incremental marginal cost of the core prod-
uct when the firm adds a new product. This provides a cost-based
measure of supply linkages across products made by the firm, and
they find that firms move towards specializing in core products in
the nineties. After controlling for plant characteristics, multiproduct
plants tend to drop products that have higher measures of dissim-
ilarity index from their core products. While Aw and Lee focus on
one sector, we study supply linkages for all manufacturing industries.
This enables us to show that supply linkages are important across a
whole host of manufacturing products. Studying the period just af-
ter the liberalization of 1991, Goldberg et al. (2009) find that Indian
firms in the nineties engaged in very little product dropping, rela-
tive to their US counterparts. They suggest that this might be due to
remnants of the licensing regime that make it difficult to drop un-
profitable products or due to the rapid growth in the post-reform era.
We find instead that Indian firms in the 2000s dropped products at
rates similar to those for US firms. Firms concentrated on on their
core products during the period and product churning was driven
by supply linkages across products. We therefore capture the process
of product turnover in firms that operated in an environment that
moved from severe constraints on product rationalization to a more
dynamic economy.
3.2 product turnover among indian manufacturing firms
3.2.1 Data
We use annual data on manufacturing firms from the Indian Annual
Survey of Industry (ASI), which is conducted by the Indian Ministry
of Statistics and Programme Implementation, and is the Indian gov-
ernment’s main source of industrial statistics on the formal manu-
facturing sector. The ASI consists of two parts: a census of all man-
ufacturing plants that are larger than 100 employees, and a random
sample of one fifth of all plants that employ between 20 and 100
workers.2 The ASI’s sampling methodology and product classifica-
tions have changed several times over the course of its history. In
order to ensure consistency, we focus on the timeframe of the fiscal
years (May to April) 2001/02 to 2007/08.
2 While the ASI is meant to sample at the plant level, firms can (and typically will)
use the same survey form for several of their plants. Hence, we generally interpret
the observations to be at the firm level.
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The unique aspect of the ASI is that it contains detailed informa-
tion on both intermediate inputs and outputs at the plant level, which
allows us to link the firm’s input characteristics to their product mix
decisions. This, in particular, distinguishes the ASI from two other
datasets that have been used to study product turnover: the US Cen-
sus Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Database, used by Bernard et
al. (2010) (henceforth Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010) (BRS)), and
the Prowess database, published by the Centre for Monitoring the
Indian Economy and used by Goldberg et al. (2009) (henceforth Gold-
berg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2009) (GKPT)) to document
product turnover among Indian manufacturing firms. Compared to
the ASI, the Prowess database contains only information on listed
firms.
3.2.2 Definition of Products
At their finest levels, BRS have 1,440 5-digit SIC products for US firms
under 455 4-digit SIC industries. GKPT have 1,886 “products” under
108 4-digit NIC industries in 22 2-digit NIC sectors. Compared to
them, we have 5,204 products in 5-digit ASIC industries and 1,108
products in 4-digit ASIC which should be comparable with the finest
levels in BRS and GKPT. These products are in 262 3-digit ASIC in-
dustries and 64 2-digit ASIC sectors, as shown in Table 15. We also
show results for nine broad sectors (1-digit ASIC).
Table 15: Product Definitions
BRS GKPT ASI
Products 1,440 1,886 5,204 5-digit/1,108 4-digit
Industries 455 108 262
Sectors 20 22 64 2-digit/9 1-digit
Classification 5/4 digit SIC CMIE/4 digit NIC 5/4/3/2/1 digit ASIC
3.2.3 Multi-Product and Multi-Industry Firms in the Aggregate Economy
We define a multi-product firm as a plant-year observation where the
plant produces two or more 4-digit (alternatively, 5-digit) products.
Table 16 shows the prevalence of multi-product and multi-industry
firms in the sample. Multi-product firms account for 41% (39% if
products are defined on the four-digit level) of observations. The num-
ber is similar in BRS and GKPT’s datasets (39% and 47%, respectively).
As is well known, multi-product firms tend to be larger: they account
of 71% of sales. Multi-sector firms account for 19% (two-digit) and
8% (one-digit) of the observations in the sample, but 49% (32% re-
spectively) of sales. In GKPT’s sample, 24% of firms are multi-sector
firms; their share in total sales is 54%.3
3 Table 25 in Appendix C compares sales shares in our sample and GKPT’s.
Table 16: Frequency and Sales Shares of Single- and Multi-product Firms
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1 152,946 58.6 28.7 159,873 61.2 30.4 176,882 67.8 37.8 212,420 81.4 50.7 239,970 91.9 68.3
2 53,859 20.6 20.4 56,503 21.6 21.5 54,777 21.0 24.1 36,568 14.0 28.4 19,219 7.4 27.3
3 26,864 10.3 12.4 24,460 9.4 14.4 19,430 7.4 13.3 8,608 3.3 12.2 1,683 0.6 4.1
4 14,477 5.5 8.6 11,413 4.4 9.7 5,869 2.2 8.0 2,523 1.0 5.0 168 0.1 0.3
5 6,183 2.4 7.4 4,585 1.8 5.7 2,415 0.9 5.3 717 0.3 2.0 15 0.0 0.0
6 3,028 1.2 3.7 2,134 0.8 4.3 1,030 0.4 5.8 180 0.1 1.6 2 0.0 0.0
7 1,678 0.6 3.7 1,085 0.4 5.6 441 0.2 2.2 34 0.0 0.0
8 1,050 0.4 3.3 599 0.2 3.6 139 0.1 1.1 5 0.0 0.0
9 641 0.2 4.9 299 0.1 2.0 51 0.0 0.6 2 0.0 0.0
10+ 331 0.1 7.1 106 0.0 2.7 23 0.0 1.8
Source: Author’s calculations from ASI data.
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3.2.4 Core competencies
Table 17 shows the sales distribution of products within firms. The
fact that the firms generate a large proportion of its sales revenue
from its primary products suggests that firms have ’core competen-
cies’. The concentration of sales is similar to the findings of GKPT
(Table 2), so we are confident that the data on reported products is
consistent with the CMIE data.
Table 17: Sales Shares by Product Rank
4-digit products 2-digit sectors
rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 100 87 78 72 62 57 54 51 46 44 1 100 86 75 68 63 59 52 56 53
2 13 17 18 21 22 22 20 20 20 2 14 19 21 21 21 21 17 21
3 5 7 10 11 11 12 12 11 3 5 8 10 10 12 12 11
4 2 5 6 64 7 8 8 4 3 5 5 7 7 9
5 2 3 4 5 5 6 5 2 3 4 5 3
6 1 2 3 4 4 6 1 2 2 1
7 1 2 3 3 7 1 1 1
8 1 2 2 8 0 1
9 1 1 9 0
10 0 1
Note: Number in the table is the average sales share of the firm’s n-th most important product/sector, ranked by sales.
Columns indicate the firm’s number of products/sectors, rows indicate the rank of the product/sector.
3.2.5 Product Turnover
We now turn to documenting product and industry turnover among
the ASI firms. Table 18 shows the fraction of firms that change their
product/industry scope over a one-year, three-year, and five-year hori-
zon. Given the nature of the ASI sampling methodology, our panel is
not balanced; an n-year horizon hence consists of all observation pairs
that are n years apart from each other. The product scope changes are
forward-looking: a plant that produces one product in year t and the
same product together with a new one in year t+ 1would be counted
as an ’add only’ for a single-product firm at the one-year horizon.
Table 18: Product Turnover
Percentage of Firms Sales-Weighted Percentage of Firms
1-year horizon 3-year horizon 5-year horizon 1-year horizon 3-year horizon 5-year horizon
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single 93 4 3 92 5 4 91 5 4 93 6 1 92 7 1 91 7 1
1-digit multi 51 4 38 7 40 4 48 8 34 3 53 9 59 5 25 11 58 5 30 7 56 4 36 4
all 89 4 4 4 86 4 5 4 85 5 6 5 81 5 9 5 80 6 10 3 80 6 12 2
single 84 7 10 81 8 11 79 9 12 89 7 4 89 7 4 89 7 4
2-digit multi 41 7 31 21 30 7 38 24 26 7 42 25 41 9 27 23 35 10 34 22 35 6 40 19
all 74 7 7 12 69 8 9 14 66 9 11 15 64 8 14 14 61 8 18 13 62 6 20 12
single 75 8 17 70 11 19 68 12 20 86 7 7 85 8 7 84 8 8
3-digit multi 36 8 24 33 26 8 29 36 22 8 31 39 29 10 25 37 23 14 26 38 22 9 34 36
all 62 8 8 22 54 10 11 25 51 10 12 27 48 9 16 27 44 12 17 27 43 9 22 26
single 63 7 30 56 10 35 52 11 37 80 5 15 79 6 15 77 7 16
4-digit multi 26 6 16 51 18 7 20 56 15 6 21 58 23 6 17 54 16 11 17 56 15 6 20 59
all 47 7 7 39 39 8 9 44 35 9 10 47 39 5 12 44 33 10 12 45 32 6 15 47
single 94 6 0 87 13 1 80 19 1 93 7 0 84 16 0 76 24 0
GKPT multi 86 9 5 1 73 17 7 2 63 26 8 3 81 14 4 1 65 25 3 7 53 29 3 15
all 90 7 2 0 80 15 3 1 72 22 4 2 83 13 3 1 69 23 2 6 57 28 2 12
Note: Number in the table is the (sales-weighted) percentage of firm-year observations that fall in the respective category. Product additions and drops are defined forward-
looking, i.e. if a firm has one product in year 2001, and sells the same product plus an additional one in year 2002, this would count as one observation in the "add only" category
in 2001 (also, it would count as a single-product firm). Hence, by definition, single-product firms cannot only drop a product. Rows “GKPT” are reproduced from Table 4 in
Goldberg et al. (2009).
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The main fact that emerges is that product turnover in the ASI
data is substantially higher than in GKPT or BRS. Even looking at
the highly aggregate 2-digit ASIC category (which has 64 product
categories), we find that 26% of all firms make some change in their
product range. GKPT find instead that only 10% of firms engage in
product range changes where the product is the finest level of aggre-
gation which has 1,500 product categories. For multi-product firms,
this difference is even wider: 59% in the ASI data compared with 14%
in GKPT. These differences are also present for both the subset of
sample firms of the ASI and the subset of census ASI firms.
Compared to GKPT, we also find substantially higher dropping of
products. In our sample, 7 percent of all firms drop products (4-digit)
without adding new ones in the same year. The figure is higher over a
three-year horizon (9%) and five-year horizon (10%). In GKPT’s sam-
ple, only 2% of firms drop products without adding new ones (3%
and 5% over a three-year and five-year horizon). This suggests that
product rationalization is indeed prevalent among Indian manufac-
turing firms. But is it important? The right panel of Table 18 weighs
the fractions of product-changing firms by their sales revenue. Twelve
percent of sales revenue gets dropped at an annual frequency with-
out being replaced by a new product in the same period (in GKPT’s
sample, the corresponding fraction is three percent). Hence, product
rationalization is not only prevalent, but also quantitatively impor-
tant.
The fact that many firms seem to be replacing existing products by
new ones raises concerns about the quality of the reported product
codes. If plant managers are inconsistent over time in their report-
ing of product codes, the true fraction of firms that is either adding
or dropping products would be higher than the observed fraction of
firms. Hence, our estimates of the prevalence of product additions or
droppings are lower bounds for the true number. Note also that mis-
reporting of product codes is likely to be washed out as we aggregate
products to three-digit industries and one- or two-digit sectors.
Perhaps the most striking difference between our results and GKPT’s
is the prevalence of product droppings by multi-product firms. In Ta-
ble 19 we decompose product scope changes by studying the transi-
tion matrix of the number of products. Element (n,k) is the number
(top panel) or percentage (lower panel) of firm-year observation with
n products that have k products the next time we observe them. The
matrix in the top panel looks fairly symmetric, suggesting that there
is no salient trend in the average number of products in our sample.
Since the distribution is skewed towards firms with fewer products,
the transition probabilities are higher for a reduction in the number
of products, which also explains the high probability of product drop-
pings among multi-product firms in Table 18.
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Table 19: Transition Matrix for the Number of Products
A. Number of Observations
# products, next time we observe the firm
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11+
#
pr
od
uc
ts
,c
ur
re
nt
pe
ri
od
1 76023 7817 1688 528 209 92 35 18 8 3 0
2 7810 19402 3766 897 260 78 31 10 5 2 1
3 1767 3597 6790 1720 451 133 51 17 12 3 1
4 597 865 1762 2890 697 206 63 26 8 5 0
5 257 244 441 696 917 334 114 51 13 8 0
6 107 77 142 224 312 338 142 55 21 4 1
7 46 43 49 75 107 143 162 83 27 6 4
8 41 16 19 22 38 62 91 99 40 7 1
9 13 3 6 8 14 26 33 44 53 13 3
10 2 1 2 8 3 4 7 8 11 8 2
11+ 0 0 0 1 0 2 4 0 1 1 8
B. Transition Probabilities
# products, next time we observe the firm
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11+
#
pr
od
uc
ts
,c
ur
re
nt
pe
ri
od
1 88 9 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 24 60 12 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 12 25 47 12 3 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 8 12 25 41 10 3 1 0 0 0 0
5 8 8 14 23 30 11 4 2 0 0 0
6 8 5 10 16 22 24 10 4 1 0 0
7 6 6 7 10 14 19 22 11 4 1 1
8 9 4 4 5 9 14 21 23 9 2 0
9 6 1 3 4 6 12 15 20 25 6 1
10 4 2 4 14 5 7 13 14 20 14 4
11+ 0 0 0 6 0 12 24 0 6 6 47
Note: Products are defined at the four-digit level.
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3.2.6 Sales Concentration and Product Turnover
We now turn to investigating the relationship between the diversifica-
tion of a firm across product lines and product turnover. We use the
specification
CHANGEjt = βCONCjt+δNUMPRODjt+γCTRLjt+αj+αt+ εjt
(32)
The dependent variable CHANGEjt ∈ {ADDjt, DROPjt} is a dummy
variable that is one if firm j either adds or drops a four-digit product
between year t and t+ 1. CONCjt is a Herfindahl-Hirschman concen-
tration index of sales among the firm’s products,
CONCjt =
∑
i∈Ijt
s2jit
where sjit is firm j’s share of sales coming from product i and Ijt
is the set of its products. An index of close to one would mean that
almost all the sales revenue is coming from a single product; if the
revenue coming from the different products is equal, the index takes
its minimum of 1/#Ijt. NUMPRODjt is a vector of dummies for the
number of products. CTRLjt is a vector of firm-year specific controls,
such as size and age, and αj and αt are firm and year fixed effects.
By using the specification of equation (32), we are studying the
correlation between product turnover and sales concentration, condi-
tional on firm characteristics. While it is true that firms with fewer
products will typically have higher concentration of sales as mea-
sured by the Herfindahl, we are explicitly taking out any effect of
the number of products on turnover by including a set of dummies
for the number of products. Hence, the coefficient β in equation (32)
is the conditional correlation of concentration and product turnover
both within the firm (over time) and within a group of firms that
have the same number of products. In order to avoid spurious results
due to potential misclassification of products, we only consider prod-
uct additions and droppings where the rest of the products range
remains unchanged (’add only’ and ’drop only’ in Table 18).
Table 20 shows the results from estimating equation (32) using ordi-
nary least squares. With a product drop dummy as a dependent vari-
able, the coefficient of the sales concentration index is positive and
statistically significant: a higher concentration of sales is positively
correlated with the firm dropping a product. Quantitatively, a one
standard deviation increase is associated with a 1.9-3.5% increase in
the probability of the firm dropping one or more products. Similarly,
with a product addition dummy as the dependent variable (columns
5 and 6 of Table 20), the coefficient of the sales concentration index
is negative and significant. Hence, firms that see an increase in their
sales concentration index are more likely to drop, and less likely to
add a product.
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Table 20: Concentration and Product Turnover
Dependent variable: Product drop dummy Product add dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CONCjt 0.101*** 0.114*** 0.166*** 0.182*** -0.127*** -0.114***
(0.00825) (0.0128) (0.0190) (0.0323) (0.0163) (0.0221)
firm age -0.00182** -0.00438*
(0.000689) (0.00173)
log firm size -0.00588*** -0.0141*** -0.0105** -0.0223* 0.00353 0.0133
(0.000739) (0.00178) (0.00380) (0.0102) (0.00326) (0.00694)
# products dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Sample full multi-product full multi-product full multi-product
N 66822 28283 66822 28283 66822 28283
R-sq 0.131 0.012 0.664 0.661 0.560 0.515
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 Note: Dependent variable is a dummy that is one if the firm adds a
product without dropping one (columns 1-4), or a dummy that is one if the firm drops a
product without adding one (columns 5 and 6). CONCjt is a Herfindahl index of the firm’s
sales shares. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level.
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What determines which products firms add? In this section, we doc-
ument a robust relationship between a firm’s intermediate input mix
and the direction of product switching. Firms tend to add (and are
less likely to drop) products that require a mix of inputs that is similar
to the firm’s existing basket of intermediate inputs. Hence, firms have
’input capabilities’ that they use to position themselves strategically
in the product spectrum.
We study the direction of product change using the following re-
gression specification:
AddProdkjt = βs
k
jt + γUpstream
k
jt +Downstream
k
jt+ (33)
+ λSameSectorkjt +αjt +α
k
t +α
k
j + ε
k
jt
The variable AddProdkjt is a dummy variable that is one if firm j
adds at least one four-digit product of the two-digit sector k during
the time between years t and t + 1; skjt is a measure of similarity
of firm j’s basket of intermediate inputs and sector k’s intermediate
input requirements. The variables Upstreamkjt and Downstream
k
jt are
measures of vertical linkages between sector k and the sectors where
firm j is active in. SameSectorkjt is a dummy variable that takes a
value of one if firm j is already producing sector k products at time t.
We include a number of fixed effects to control for unobserved
heterogeneity. αjt is a firm-year fixed effect, and takes out any factors
that may influence the firm’s decision to change the product scope at
all; αkt is a sector-year fixed effect that controls for aggregate sector k
supply and demand shocks, and αkj is a firm-sector fixed effect that
controls for time-invariant firm-sector-specific capabilities.
Equation (33) explains product additions through the similarity be-
tween the firm’s current basket of intermediate inputs and the sector
in which the firm may add a product, controlling for vertical linkages
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between that sector and the firm’s current product mix. The presence
of firm-year fixed effects means that the variation we exploit is within
firm-year observations (across targeted sectors), with αkt eliminating
the effect of sector-wide demand and supply shocks. When includ-
ing the αkj fixed effect in the regression, we identify the relationship
from time variation in the dependent and independent variable: does
a change in the composition of the input basket make it more likely
that the firm moves into segments of the product space that require a
similar mix of inputs?
3.3.1 A Measure of Input Similarity
Our measure of input similarity is a normalized inner product (or
correlation coefficient) between the firm’s intermediate input expen-
diture shares and the sector’s aggregate intermediate input shares,
which are typically observed in Input-Output tables. The fact that our
dataset contains detailed information on intermediate inputs allows
us to calculate these aggregate intermediate input shares ourselves.
More precisely, we define the input similarity of firm j with sector k
as
skjt =
∑N
n=1 θ
n
jtθ
n
k√(∑N
n=1
(
θnjt
)2)(∑N
n=1
(
θnk
)2)
where θnjt is firm j’s share of spending on intermediate inputs coming
from sector n, and θnk is the aggregate share of spending on interme-
diate inputs from sector n of plants that derive the largest fraction of
their revenue from a product belonging to sector k (henceforth called
’sector k plants’). It is easy to show that skjt is bounded below by zero
and above by one, takes a value of zero if and only if firm j and sec-
tor k have no two-digit inputs in common, and takes a value of one
if and only if the input expenditure shares of firm j and sector k are
the same.
3.3.2 Vertical Linkages
We consider two sectors to be strongly vertically linked if the ex-
penditure share in the input-output table is high. Hence, we define
Upstreamkjt as the expenditure share of firm j’s two-digit sector on
intermediate inputs from sector k, and Downstreamkjt as the expen-
diture share of sector k on inputs from firm j’s two-digit sector. In
case firm j’s products span more than one two-digit sector, we take
the maximum of each of the sectors’ input expenditure shares. We
calculate the two measures ourselves from the microdata on inter-
mediate inputs; in doing so, we aggregate across years and do not
distinguish between imports and domestically sourced intermediate
inputs.
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3.3.3 Results
Table 22 shows the result of estimating equation (33) using ordinary
least squares, with standard errors clustered at the firm level in columns
5 and 6. To avoid misclassification of products to induce spurious
product additions and hence measurement error in the dependent
variable, we only consider product additions that occur without the
firm dropping a product in the same year. Hence, our estimate should
be regarded as a lower bound for the importance of the firm’s input
basket in shaping the direction of product change.
The estimate of the input similarity index in Table 22 is negative
and significant at the 1% level throughout all specifications, which
leads us to conclude that the firm’s current basket of intermediate
inputs is a causal factor in driving the direction of product additions,
with firms preferring to add products in sectors that share common
intermediate inputs with the firm’s existing activities.
The coefficient on the SameSectorljt is positive and statistically sig-
nificant in columns 1 to 5, suggesting that firms are more likely to
add products in sectors in which they are already active. However,
once one controls for time-invariant capabilities of firms by including
firm-sector fixed effects, the coefficient switches sign and becomes
significantly negative: once the firm has moved into a new two-digit
sector (and hence the dummy changes from zero to one), the firm is
less likely to add new products in that sector.
Firms are also more likely to add new products in sectors that are
vertically linked to the firm’s product portfolio: the coefficients of
both Upstreamkjt and Downstream
k
jt in columns 1 to 5 of Table 22
are positive; the former being much larger than the latter. When con-
ditioning on time-invariant characteristics at the firm-sector level (col-
umn 6), the coefficient becomes negative, suggesting that firms tend
to avoid adding products in sectors that are vertically linked to the
ones that they have moved into.
3.3.4 Product Droppings
Do input capabilities also manifest themselves in product droppings?
To study this question, we estimate the following regression equation:
DropProdkjt = βs
k
jt + λSameSector
k
jt +αjt +α
k
t +α
k
j + ε
k
jt (34)
The variables and fixed effects are defined analogously to equation
(33). Since product droppings are only possible in sectors where the
firm is producing at least one product, we control for a dummy that is
one if firm j is producing a product in sector k at time t. The resulting
estimates are hence numerically equivalent to estimating equation
(34) only on the subset of sectors where the firm is producing at least
one product, without the same Sector dummy.
Table 21 shows results from estimating equation (34) using ordi-
nary least squares. Again we only consider product droppings that
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Table 21: Input capabilities: Product Droppings
Dependent variable: Product drop dummy
(1) (2) (3)
Similarity Index skjt -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001**
(0.00003) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Same Sector dummy 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.042***
(0.00004) (0.0003) (0.001)
Firm-year FE αjt yes yes yes
Sector-year FE αtkt no yes yes
Firm-sector FE αkj no no yes
Clustering no firm firm
N 18,563,460 18,563,460 18,563,460
R2 0.042 0.043 0.243
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Table 22: Input capabilities: Product Additions
Dependent variable: Product addition dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Similarity Index skjt 0.0057779** 0.0061662** 0.0017977** 0.0020104** 0.0020104** 0.0013595**
(.0000246) (.0000253) (.0000346) (.0000358) (.0001067) (.0003947)
Same Sector dummy 0.0063971** 0.0063555** 0.0063555** -0.0161054**
(.0000539) (.0000545) (.000228) (.0008082)
Downstream proximity 0.0004985** 0.0003605** 0.0003605 -0.0085875**
(.0000848) (.0000866) (.0002468) (.0008181)
Upstream proximity 0.0110931** 0.0106407** 0.0106407** -0.0086534**
(.0000889) (.000095) (.0003395) (.0017088)
Firm-year FE αjt no yes yes yes yes yes
Sector-year FE αkt no no no yes yes yes
Firm-sector FE αkj no no no no no yes
Clustering no no no no firm firm
N 18,563,460 18,563,460 18,254,069 18,254,069 18,254,069 18,254,069
R2 0.003 0.0247 0.031 0.0316 0.0316 0.2334
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
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occur without a product addition by the same firm in the same year.
The coefficient of the similarity index is negative and statistically sig-
nificant, suggesting that firms tend to avoid dropping products that
require an input mix that is closer to what the firm is using.
3.4 conclusion
The firm’s product scope and turnover is a popular subject for study
among the literature in economics and business, yet there is little
concrete evidence of the determinants of the direction of product
turnover. This paper has established that input competencies are one
important factor in this decision: firms tend to add products that
share similar input characteristics with the firm’s existing products.
More generally, our paper has investigated product turnover in a
large developing country. While previous work has suggested that
product droppings in India have been lower because of its history of
licensing constraints, we instead find product churning rates that are
comparable to the United States.
Part II
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a.1 proofs
a.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
For the sake of ease of exposition, I will refer to the supplier as
the ’seller’, and the intermediary as the ’buyer’. A contract is a pair
(q∗,M(q)) where q∗ > 0 and M : [0,q∗] → R\R− is a nonnegative
increasing function. I call a contract C feasible if there is a quan-
tity q > 0 such that the ex-ante profit from the relationship to the
seller if he produces q, pis(C,q), is nonnegative. Feasible contracts
will be accepted by a potential supplier. Moreover, I call a quantity
qˆ > 0 implementable if there is a feasible contract C such that the
seller decides to produce qˆ once he has accepted the contract (i.e.
qˆ = arg maxq pis(C,q)). Finally, a feasible contract C is optimal if the
payoff to the buyer under the seller’s optimal production choice is
maximal in the class of feasible contracts (i.e. Cˆ is optimal if Cˆ =
arg maxC, C feasible pib(C, arg maxq pis(C,q))).
Suppose the buyer and seller have signed a feasible contract C. Our
first step is to find the payoff functions for the buyer and seller, pib
and pis. Let q be the produced quantity. Distinguish two cases:
1. The seller decides to breach the contract by producing less than
the stipulated quantity: q < q∗. The buyer will then hold up
the seller by refusing to pay M(q). I will show later that this
is indeed optimal. If one of the two parties decides to go to
court, the court would (i) order the buyer to pay the agreed
fee M(q) to the seller, (ii) order the seller to pay damages to
compensate the buyer for the loss that has arisen due to breach.
Under fulfillment of the contract, the buyer should receive the
proceeds from selling q∗ to the downstream firm, R(q∗), minus
the fee paid to the seller, M(q∗). Thus, the amount of damages
are
D(q,q∗) ≡ R(q∗) −M(q∗) − (R(q) −M(q)) . (35)
The plaintiff also has to pay enforcement costs. In order to de-
termine who the plaintiff would be, we need to distinguish be-
tween two subcases.
a) M(q) −D(q,q∗) > 0. In this case the fee that the seller
would receive exceed the damages that he would have to
pay, thus the seller would have an incentive to go to court.
If he did that, he would receive the above amount minus
enforcement costs, which amount to a fraction δ of the
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value of the claim. Thus, under enforcement, the supplier
would get
(1− δ) (M(q) −D(q,q∗)) , (36)
whereas the intermediary would get the revenue from sell-
ing to the downstream firm, net of fees M(q) and plus
damage payments
R(q) +D(q,q∗) −M(q). (37)
From the definition of the damages (35) it is easy to see that
the latter equals R(q∗) −M(q∗). Since enforcement entails
a social loss of δ (M(q) −D(q,q∗)), the buyer and seller
will bargain over the surplus and settle out of court. (36)
and (37) are the seller’s and buyer’s outside options in the
Nash bargaining. The symmetric solution in the bargaining
leaves each party with its outside option and one-half of
the quasi-rents (surplus minus the sum of outside options).
Thus, the total payoffs under breach are, respectively
pis(q) =
(
1−
1
2
δ
)
(M(q) −D(q,q∗)) − cq if q < q∗(38)
pib(q) = R(q) −
(
1−
1
2
δ
)
(M(q) −D(q,q∗)) if q < q∗
Comparing pib here with the payoff in case the buyer did
not hold up the seller, R(q) −M(q), shows that it is prefer-
able for the buyer to hold up. Note that since the buyer
already has control over the produced goods, the seller can-
not revert the production process.
b) M(q) −D(q,q∗) < 0. In this case, the damages paid to the
buyer exceed the fee that he would have to pay to the seller.
The buyer thus has an incentive to enforce the contract in a
court, and would have to pay the enforcement costs. Thus,
under enforcement, the seller’s payoff is
M(q) −D(q,q∗)
and the buyer’s payoff is
R(q) +D(q,q∗) −M(q) − δ (D(q,q∗) −M(q)) .
The two parties settle outside of court using the symmet-
ric Nash sharing rule; each receives its outside option (i.e.
payoff under enforcement) plus one half of the quasi-rents
(enforcement costs). Thus, the seller’s ex-ante payoff is
pis (q) = M(q) −D(q,q∗) +
1
2
δ (D(q,q∗) −M(q)) − cq
=
(
1−
1
2
δ
)
(M(q) −D(q,q∗)) − cq < 0
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Since the ex-ante payoff of the seller is negative and we are
only considering feasible contracts (i.e. the seller’s payoff
function is nonnegative for some q), this case will never be
chosen by the seller.
2. Fulfillment of the contract, q > q∗. The supplier delivers q∗
units and holds back the rest. The intermediary holds up the
supplier by refusing to pay M(q∗) (again, comparing this to the
non-hold-up payoff shows that this is optimal). If the supplier
goes to court to claim his payment, he would receive M(q∗) mi-
nus the enforcement costs δM(q∗). The court awards no dam-
ages, since there has not been any loss in value.1 Since going to
court entails a welfare loss, the parties are going to settle out-
side of court using the symmetric Nash sharing rule. Under the
settlement the supplier receives M(q∗) − δM(q∗) + 12δM(q
∗) =(
1− 12δ
)
M(q∗), and the buyer receives R(q∗)−M(q∗)+ 12δM(q
∗).
Once this is done, there may be excess production q− q∗ left,
which is still more valuable to the buyer than to the seller. Again,
the two parties bargain over the surplus from these goods, which
is the additional revenue from selling the excess production to
the downstream firm, R(q) − R(q∗). Since there is no contract
governing the sale of these goods, the seller is left with the op-
tion to revert the production process if the bargaining breaks
down, in which case he gets ωc (q− q∗) (whereas the buyer
gets nothing2). The quasi-rents are the difference between the
surplus and the sum of the outside options, R(q) − R(q∗) −
ωc (q− q∗). Under the Nash sharing rule, the supplier receives
in addition to his payoff from the settlement of the contract dis-
pute
ωc (q− q∗)+
1
2
(R(q) − R(q∗) −ωc (q− q∗)) =
1
2
(R(q) − R(q∗) +ωc (q− q∗))
which means that his overall ex-ante payoff is
pis(q) =
(
1−
1
2
δ
)
M(q∗)+
1
2
(R(q) − R(q∗) +ωc (q− q∗))−cq if q > q∗
(39)
and the intermediary receives in the second settlement
1
2
(R(q) − R(q∗) −ωc (q− q∗))
which means his total ex-ante payoff is
pib(q) = R(q
∗)−
(
1−
1
2
δ
)
M(q∗)+
1
2
(R(q) − R(q∗) −ωc (q− q∗)) if q > q∗.
1 Cf. Farnsworth (2004), §12.10 in US law.
2 These payoffs are in addition to the payoffs from the first bargaining (R(q∗) −
1
2δM(q
∗) and (1− 12δ)M(q
∗) for the intermediary and supplier, respectively).
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We have now characterized the payoff functions for seller and buyer,
for a given contract. Going back in time, the supplier chooses q opti-
mally to maximize his ex-ante payoff pis. Let’s first establish the fact
that the supplier’s payoff function is continuous at q∗, which means
that it is impossible to punish him for breaching the contract.
Lemma 1 Let (q∗,M(q)) be a feasible contract. The supplier’s payoff func-
tion pis is continuous at q∗.
Proof 1 The left-limit of pis at q∗ only exists if q∗ > 0, in which case it is
lim
q↗q∗
pis(q) =
(
1−
1
2
δ
)
M(q∗) − cq∗
and the right-limit of pis(q) at q∗ is
lim
q↘q∗
pis(q) =
(
1−
1
2
δ
)
M(q∗) − cq∗
which is the same as the left-limit, thus pis is continuous at q∗.
Let’s now look at the set of implementable quantities. The seller’s
payoff maximization problem is
max
q
pis(q) = max
(
max
q,q<q∗
pis(q), max
q,q>q∗
pis(q)
)
. (40)
Denote the interior maxima of (38) and (39) by qδ and qω respectively.
They satisfy the first-order conditions
R′(qδ) =
1
1− 12δ
c
R′(qω) = (2−ωi) c.
From (40) and the fact that both expressions pis(q) for q < q∗ and
q > q∗ have unique maxima at qδ and qω respectively, it is clear
that the arg maxq pis(q) can only be either qδ, qω, or q∗. Because of
the continuity of pis, q∗ can only be implementable if either q∗ 6 qδ
or q∗ 6 qω.3 Also, note that both qδ and qω do not depend on the
contract (q∗,M(q∗)) – though whether they will be chosen by the
supplier depends of course on the contract.
We now turn to the optimal contracting problem. In a world where
the Coase Theorem holds, the buyer would implement the efficient
quantity q˜ = arg maxq R(q) − cq and appropriate all the rents from
the relationship. In the world of my model, since the implementable
quantities are all less or equal4 q˜, a contract that implements the
largest implementable quantity (either qδ or qω) and leaves the full
surplus from the relationship with the buyer will be an optimal con-
tract. In the following I will construct such a contract. Distinguish
two cases:
3 Suppose q∗ > qδ and q∗ > qω. Because of continuity of pis and the fact that R is
concave, either pis(qδ) > pis(q∗) or pis(qω) > pis(q∗), thus q∗ is not implementable.
4 Equal if and only if either ω = 1 or δ = 0.
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1. Case 1, 2−ωi > 1/(1− 12δ), or, equivalently, qω 6 qδ. In this
case, choosing q∗ to be greater than qδ and setting
M(q) =M(q∗) =
1
1− 12δ
cqδ + R(q
∗) − R(qδ)
will implement qδ. The seller’s payoff under q = qδ is then zero,
and the buyer receives R(qδ) − cqδ.
2. Case 2, 2 −ωi < 1/(1 − 12δ), or, equivalently, qω > qδ. The
buyer wants to implement qω. Set M(q∗) = 0 and q∗ such that
R(qω) − (2−ωi)qωc = R(q
∗) +ωiq∗c. (41)
Such a q∗ exists because the RHS of this equation is zero for
q∗ = 0 and goes to infinity for q∗ → ∞, and is continuous in
q∗, and the LHS is positive. Furthermore, it satisfies q∗ < qω.
Distinguish two subcases.
a) q∗ > qδ. Then the greatest profit that could be obtained by
breaking the contract is(
1−
1
2
δ
)
(R(qδ) +M(q
∗) − R(q∗)) − cqδ
=
(
1−
1
2
δ
)
(R(qδ) − R(q
∗)) − cqδ < 0
thus q = qω is incentive-compatible.
b) q∗ < qδ. Since pis(q) is increasing for all q < q∗, an upper
bound for the profits that could be obtained by breaking
the contract is(
1−
1
2
δ
)
(R(q∗) +M(q∗) − R(q∗)) − cq∗ = −cq∗ < 0
thus q = qω is incentive-compatible.
Thus, setting M(q∗) = 0 and q∗ as in (41) implements qω with
pis(qω) = 0.
a.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
1. We have
pni(j) = min
(
plni(j),p
x
ni(j)
)
and
plni(j) =
w
sni(j)
pxni(j) =
σn
σn − 1
pidni
zni(j)
.
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From the fact that zni(j) follows a Frechet distribution,
P(zni(j) < z) = e
−Tiz
−θ
we have that
P(plni(j) > c) = exp
(
−Sn
(w
c
)−θ)
and analogous for sni(j),
P(pxni(j) > c) = exp
(
−Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
pidni
c
)−θ)
P(pni(j) < c) = 1− P(pni(j) > c) = 1− exp
(
−Sn
(w
c
)−θ
− Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
pidni
c
)−θ)
= 1− exp
(
−
(
Snw
−θ + Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
pidni
)−θ)
cθ
)
= 1− e−Φnic
θ
where
Φni =
(
Snw
−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
)
. (42)
and µn = σn/ (σn − 1). Denote
Qni =
(∫1
0
qni(j)
(σn−1)/σndj
) σn
σn−1
then
yn =
(
N∑
i=1
γ
1/ρ
ni Q
ρ−1
ρ
ni
)ρ/(ρ−1)
Derive the demand function for sector n firms,
min
Qni
∑
i
PniQni s.t. yn = 1
thus
Pni = λ
(
N∑
i=1
γ
1/ρ
ni Q
ρ−1
ρ
ni
)1/(ρ−1)
γ
1/ρ
ni Q
− 1ρ
ni
Pni = λy
1/ρ
n γ
1/ρ
ni Q
− 1ρ
ni
Qni = γni
(
λ
Pni
)ρ
yn (43)
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From plugging this into the formula for yn,
pn ≡ λ =
(
N∑
i=1
γniP
1−ρ
ni
)1/(1−ρ)
and similarly
Pni =
(∫
pni(j)
1−σn
)1/(1−σn)
.
The latter becomes, using the distribution of pni(j) above,
Pni =
(∫1
0
pni(j)
1−σndj
)1/(1−σn)
=
(∫∞
0
θp1−σn+θ−1ni Φnie
−Φnic
θ
dc
)1/(1−σn)
=
(∫∞
0
θ
(
Φnic
θ
)(θ−σn)/θ
Φ
σn/θ
ni e
−Φnic
θ
dc
)1/(1−σn)
=
(∫∞
0
θt(θ−σn)/θΦ
σn/θ
ni e
−tΦ−1ni θ
−1c1−θdt
)1/(1−σn)
=
(
Φ
(σn−1)/θ
ni
∫∞
0
t
1−σn
θ e−tdt
)1/(1−σn)
=
(
Γ
(
1− σn + θ
θ
)) 1
1−σn
Φ
− 1θ
ni
Thus the cost of one unit of yn is
pn ≡
(
N∑
i=1
γni
(
αnΦ
− 1θ
ni
)1−ρ)1/(1−ρ)
where
αn ≡
(
Γ
(
1− σn + θ
θ
)) 1
1−σn
and Φni as defined above.
2. The probability that activity (n, i, j) is outsourced is
pini(j) ≡ P(pxni(j) 6 plni(j)) =
∫∞
0
exp
(
−Sn
(
σn
σn − 1
w
p
)−θ)
dFpx(p)
=
∫∞
0
Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
)−θ
(pidni)
−θ θpθ−1 exp
(
−Φnip
θ
)
dp
= Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
)−θ
(pidni)
−θ 1
Φni
∫∞
0
θpθ−1Φni exp
(
−Φnip
θ
)
dp
=
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
Φni
=
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
Snw−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
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and because of a Law of Large Numbers, it is also the frac-
tion of type-i varieties that sector n sources from sector i. The
distribution of cost pni(j) conditional on activity (n, i, j) being
outsourced is
pni|x(j) ≡ P
(
pni(j) < p|p
x
ni(j) 6 plni(j)
)
=
1
pini(j)
∫p
0
exp
(
−Sn
(
σn
σn − 1
w
z
)−θ)
dFpx(z)
=
1
pini(j)
∫p
0
Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
)−θ
(pidni)
−θ θzθ−1 exp
(
−Φniz
θ
)
dz
=
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
pini(j)
1
Φni
∫p
0
Φniθz
θ−1 exp
(
−Φniz
θ
)
dz
= 1− e−Φnip
θ
= P (pni(j) < p)
From this, it follows that the fraction of expenditure on out-
sourced type-i activities in total expenditure on type-i activities
is also pini(j),∫1
0 pini(j)pni|x(j)qni(j)dj∫1
0 pni(j)qni(j)
= pini(j) = pini.
Let’s calculate the expenditure on outsourced type-i activities
in total expenditure. From (43), the expenditure share on type-i
activities is
PniQni
pnyn
= γni
(
Pni
pn
)1−ρ
.
where Pni = αnΦ
− 1θ
ni . Thus, the expenditure share on outsourced
type-i activities is
Xni
pnyn
= γniα
1−ρ
n

(
Snw
−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
)−1/θ
pn

1−ρ
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
Snw−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
= γniα
1−ρ
n p
ρ−1
n
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ(
Snw−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
)1+(1−ρ)/θ .
I provide here a brief sketch of the proof of Xni/Xn being de-
creasing in dni. Note that
Xni
Xn
= γniα
1−ρ
n

(
Snw
−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
)−1/θ
pn

1−ρ
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
Snw−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
(44)
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We now look at the log-derivative of each of these terms and
determine their sign. Since ∂ logpi/∂ logdni > 0, we have that
∂ log
(
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
)
∂ logdni
< 0
and thus the second fraction of (44) is decreasing in dni. By the
same argument,
(
Snw
−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
)−1/θ
is increasing
in dni. Since pn is a harmonic mean of the aforementioned and
other expressions, pn must rise less than
(
Snw
−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
)−1/θ
to any change in dni (intuitively, the firms can substitute away).
Thus, since ρ > 1, the second term in (44) is also decreasing in
dni.
a.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Lemma 2 Suppose
fn(z) =
N∑
i
(
ani + bniz
η
i
) 1
η
with 1 > η > 0, and
ρ(B1/η) < 1
where B1/η =
(
b
1/η
ni
)
n,i
and ρ (·) is the spectral radius. Then f(z) has a
unique fixed point z∗, and z∗ = limn→∞ f(n)(z).
Proof 2 The Jacobian is
∂fn
∂zi
=
(
ani + bniz
η
i
) 1
η−1 bniz
η−1
i =
bni(
ani + bniz
η
i
)1−1/η
z1−η
=
bni(
aniz
−η
i + bni
)1−1/η
=
(
b
η
1−η
ni aniz
−η
i + b
1
1−η
ni
)1/η−1
=
(
b−1ni aniz
−η
i + 1
)1/η−1
b
1
η
ni
We have that, if η < 1
lim
zi→0
∂fn
∂zi
=∞, lim
zi→∞
∂fn
∂zi
= b
1/η
ni
The second derivatives are
∂2fn
∂z2i
= −η (1/η− 1)
(
b−1ni aniz
−η
i + 1
)1/η−2
b−1ni z
−η−1
i anib
1
η
ni < 0
and 0 for the cross derivatives, thus fn is globally concave, with the Jacobian
converging monotonically to B1/η for z → ∞. Since the space is finite-
dimensional, this convergence is uniform.
A.2 extensions 82
Since the spectral radius is a continuous mapping, we can find a z such
that ρ
(
Df
Dz
(z)
)
6 r < 1 for all z > z. Let Z ≡ {z ∈ RN : z >z}. Given the
concavity of fn, there is a z∗ ∈ Z such that∣∣fn(z′) − fn(z)∣∣ 6∑
i
∂fn
∂z∗i
∣∣z′i − zi∣∣
with ρ (Df/dz∗) 6 r. Thus f is aDf/dz∗-contraction on Z and by Theorem
13.1.2 in Ortega and Rheinboldt (1970) limn→∞ f(n)(z) is the unique fixed
point of f.
Proposition 4 Assume that
ρ
((
α1−ρn γni
) θ
ρ−1 Tiµ
−θ
n
)
< 1.
and that 0 < θ/ (ρ− 1) < 1. Then, for all (dni)n,i with dni > 1 for all
n, i, an equilibrium price vector p exists and is unique.
Proof 3 The price vector satisfies the system of equations
pn ≡ αn
(
N∑
i=1
γni
((
Snw
−θ + Ti (piµndni)
−θ
)−1/θ)1−ρ)1/(1−ρ)
(45)
which can be rewritten
zn ≡
N∑
i=1
(
γ
θ/(ρ−1)
ni α
−θ
n Snw
−θ + γ
θ/(ρ−1)
ni α
−θ
n Ti (µndni)
−θ z
η
i
)1/η
(46)
with zn = p
1−ρ
n and η = θρ−1 . We have that
ρ
((
α1−ρn γni
) θ
ρ−1 Tiµ
−θ
n d
−θ
ni
)
6 ρ
((
α1−ρn γni
) θ
ρ−1 Tiµ
−θ
n
)
< 1
and 0 < η < 1, and by Lemma 2 there exists a unique z that satisfies (46)
and thus a unique p that satisfies (45).
a.2 extensions
a.2.1 A model with a delivery decision
Consider a model that differs from the one in Section 1.2 in the follow-
ing way. After production has taken place, the seller faces the decision
of how much of the produced goods to deliver to the buyer. Denote
this quantity by d. Once delivered, the goods cannot be retrieved any-
more. The stipulated quantity q∗ in the contract is the quantity to
be delivered. Both buyer and the court have no way of verifying that
any goods in excess of d have been produced. The enforcement of the
contract is as described in Section 1.2. Once the parties have settled,
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the seller and the buyer may bargain over the surplus from the excess
production, with the control over the goods being with the seller (i.e.
he can partially revert the production process in case the bargaining
breaks down). Again the settlement is as described in Section 1.2.
First, note that the seller will not deliver more than q∗ to the buyer:
the contract and the court will not reward him for producing/deliv-
ering more than q∗. Suppose now that the seller delivers 0 6 d 6 q∗
and holds back x ≡ q− d > 0. Then his payoff is(
1−
1
2
δ
)
(R(d) − R(q∗) +M(q∗))+
1
2
(R(d+ x) − R(d) +ωcx)−c (d+ x) .
and his profit maximization problem consists of maximizing this ex-
pression subject to the constraints d > 0, d 6 q∗, and x > 0. Note that
if δ < 1, the first constraint is never binding, since limd→0 R(d) =∞.
The first-order conditions for this problem are(
1−
1
2
δ
)
R′(d) +
1
2
(
R′(d+ x) − R′(d)
)
= c (47)
1
2
(
R′(d+ x) +ωc
)
= c (48)
Let’s discuss all cases. For q∗ sufficiently high, we have that (47) holds.
If
1
2
(
R′(d) +ωc
)
> c
then the seller holds back some production ((48) holds), and we have
R′(d+ x) = (2−ω) c
R′(d) =
ωc
1− δ
. (49)
R′(d) > (2−ω) c and R′(d) = ωc1−δ implies that
ωc
1−δ > (2−ω) c and
thus qω > qδ. Thus, this case can only happen if the latter holds.
On the other hand, if 12 (R
′(d) +ωc) < c, then x = 0 and d satisfies(
1− 12δ
)
R′(d) = c thus d = qδ.
If (47) does not hold, then d = q∗. As above, if R′(d) > (2−ω) c
then R′(d+ x) = (2−ω) c, otherwise x = 0, and d < qδ.
To summarize, it is impossible to implement a higher quantity than
max(qδ,qω). It remains to show that there is a contract that imple-
ments max(qδ,qω) and where the seller is pushed down to his par-
ticipation constraint.
• Case 1, 2−ωi > 1/(1− 12δ), or, equivalently, qω 6 qδ. In this
case, choosing q∗ to be greater than qδ and setting
M(q) =M(q∗) =
1
1− 12δ
cqδ + R(q
∗) − R(q)
will implement d = qδ, since R′(d) = 1/(1 − 12δ) and thus
R′(d) < 2−ω means x = 0.
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• Case 2, 2 −ωi < 1/(1 − 12δ), or, equivalently, qω > qδ. Total
payoff to seller is(
1−
1
2
δ
)
(R(d) − R(q∗) +M(q∗))+
1
2
(R(qω) − R(d) +ωc(qω − d))−cqω
Set M(q∗) = 0 and q∗ such that(
1−
1
2
δ
)
(R(d) − R(q∗))+
1
2
(R(qω) − R(d) +ωc(qω − d) = cqω
where d satisfies equation (49). The q∗ is greater than d. Since
2−ωi < 1/(1−
1
2δ), we have that R
′(d) > (2−ω) c, thus q > d
and R′(d+ x) = (2−ω) c.
a.2.2 How important are Input-Output Linkages?
In order to get a sense of how much the input-output linkages be-
tween sectors contribute to the welfare gains from reducing enforce-
ment costs, I discuss here a version of the model without linkages.
Assume that the production function in the case of outsourcing is
linear in labor instead of sector i output,
qni(j) = znil(n, i, j)
where l(n, i, j) denotes labor input, and zni is the Frechet-distributed
productivity realization as in section 1.2.1.2. Then, the equations for
sectoral price levels and input expenditure shares, (12) and (13), be-
come
pn =
(
N∑
i=1
γni
(
αn
(
Snw
−θ + Ti (wµndni)
−θ
)− 1θ)1−ρ)1/(1−ρ)
(50)
Xni
Xn
= γniα
1−ρ
n p
ρ−1
n
Ti (µnwdni)
−θ(
Snw−θ + Ti (µnwdni)
−θ
)1+(1−ρ)/θ .
(51)
The estimation of equations (50) and (51) yields exactly the same
point estimates as in the main text, since pi and Ti only appear to-
gether in (12) and (13) and are thus not separately identified.
I then calibrate the remaining parameters and perform the welfare
counterfactuals as described in Section 1.4.1, using the baseline spec-
ifications (Broda-Weinstein elasticities, ω(1)ni ). Figure 9 compares the
welfare increases in the model without input-output linkages (white
dots) with the baseline model (black dots), when enforcement costs
are reduced to zero. The welfare gains in the model without intersec-
toral linkages are roughly half as big as in the baseline model, which
implies that the I-O linkages magnify the macroeconomic importance
of transaction costs by a factor of two.
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Figure 9: Welfare gains with and without I-O linkages
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Note: Welfare gains with I-O linkages in black, without I-O linkages in white. Both
are calculated using the benchmark specification (Broda-Weinstein elasticities,ω(1)ni ).
a.3 data description
a.3.1 Construction of the enforcement-intensity measures
I start off with all cases in the ’Federal and State court cases’ reposi-
tory from LexisLibrary that are between January 1990 and December
2012 and include ’contract’ as one of their core terms.5 I then ex-
clude all cases that are filed in a court of appeals, or a higher court.
If there have been any counterclaims, I treat them as separate cases.
This leaves me with 23261 cases that span 34219 plaintiffs and 50599
defendants.
I match the plaintiffs and defendants to the universe of US firms
that are contained in the Orbis database of firms, based on the name
strings.6 I use a Fellegi-Sunter matching algorithm that compares the
occurence of bigrams in each possible pairing. The first four charac-
ters are weighted more heavily. If the score is above a threshold (0.92),
I consider the match to be successful. I then match the SIC classifica-
tions from Orbis to GTAP sectors, using a hand-written concordance
table, which is partly based on the definition of the GTAP sectors in
terms of CPC or ISIC codes7, and partly on the description of the
sectors. Since I am only interested in the industry of the plaintiff and
defendant firms, if both firm names in a candidate pair contain the
same trade name (’bank’,’architects’, etc.), I also regard the pair as
matched even if their matching score is below the threshold.
Table 23 summarizes the results of the matching process. I manage
to associate 52.2 percent of all parties to firms in Orbis. In order to
see whether the fraction of matched entries is close to the number of
possible matches, one needs to know the fraction of businesses (or
at least non-individuals) among the plaintiffs and defendants. This
5 I thank Jinesh Patel and the legal team at LexisNexis UK for permission to automat-
ically retrieve and process the LexisLibrary data.
6 This includes many US subsidiaries of foreign firms. The total number of US firms
in my version of Orbis is 21,014,945.
7 See https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/contribute/concordinfo.asp
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information is not available in LexisLibrary. However, I compare the
matching rates with the fraction of business plaintiffs and defendants
in an auxiliary dataset, the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992,
which covers (among other things) a sample of 6,802 contract cases
in state courts.8 In that dataset, 53.9 percent of all parties are non-
individuals, and 49.6 percent are businesses. Even though it is likely
that parties in federal courts are more likely to be businesses and
organizations rather than individuals, I view this comparison as sup-
porting the view that I am able to match most of the relevant parties.
Table 23: Matching Plaintiffs and Defendants to Orbis Firms: Statis-
tics
Plaintiffs Defendants All
number in pct number in pct number in pct
Handmatched: 169 223 392
Population: 34388 100.0 50822 100.0 85210 100.0
perfect matches 1649 4.8 1666 3.3 3315 3.9
Matches: above threshold 13058 38.0 25838 50.8 38896 45.6
based on trade name 839 2.4 1419 2.8 2258 2.6
Total matches: 15546 45.2 28923 56.9 44469 52.2
Civil Justice Survey: non-individuals 53.9
businesses 49.6
a.3.2 Input-Output data
My data on input-output tables come from Version 8 of the Global
Trade Analysis Database (Narayanan et al., 2012). Table 24, which is
taken from its documentation, shows which year each of the country
tables correspond to, and the primary source.
Table 24: I-O tables in GTAP 8: Years and Sources
Country Year Source
Albania 2000 Albanian Ministry of Finance (2001), and others
Argentina 2000 National Institute of Statistics and Census, and Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock-farming, Fisheries and
Food Industry
Armenia 2002 Social accounting matrix developed by Miles K. Light, Ekaterine Vashakmadze, and Artsvi Khatchatryan.
Australia 2005 MMRF database derived from ABS Input Output tables, 2005-06
Austria 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Azerbaijan 2001 Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan Republic in Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan 2005.
Bahrain 2005 Central Informatics Organisation, Bahrain. Detailed national accounts statistics 2006 and 2007, Central
Informatics Organisation, Bahrain. Also, the Kuwait I/O table.
Bangladesh 1993-94 Bangladesh Planning Commission and Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (1998)
Belarus 2004 Ministry of Statistics and Analysis of Belarus (2006)
Belgium 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Bolivia 2004 Industry Instituto Nacional de Estadï¿œstica
Botswana 1993-94 McDonald
Brazil 2005 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica - IBGE
Bulgaria 2000 also discussions with taxation officials. Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Cambodia 2003 National Institute of Statistics (2006), National Institute of Statistics (2005), and National Bank of Cambodia
(2006)
8 See US Department of Justice (1996) for a description. In calculating the figures in
Table 23 I exclude cases that pertain to mortgage foreclosure, rental agreements,
fraud, and employment.
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Country Year Source
Cameroon 2003 Not specified.
Canada 2003 Statistics Canada
Chile 2003 Banco Central de Chile (2001)
China 2007 Input-Output Tables of China 2007
Colombia 2003 Colombian National Statistical Office (DANE)
Costa Rica 2002 SAM built by Sanchez (2006), based on data from Central Bank of Costa Rica
Cote d’Ivoire 1998 1998 Input-Output table for Cote d’Ivoire
Croatia 1995 Henrichsmeyer, W., J. Kï¿œckler, A. Quiring and T. Mï¿œllmann (1999)
Cyprus 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Czech Republic 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Denmark 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Ecuador 2004 Central Bank of Ecuador (2000)
Egypt 2003 National Accounts, National Planning Unit of Egypt
El Salvador 2000 Social Accounting Matrix, year 2000, from IFPRI (International Food Policy Reasearch Institute)
Estonia 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Ethiopia 2002 Social Accounting Matrix 2001/02 compiled by IDS in collaboration with EDRI
Finland 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
France 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Georgia 2001 Unofficial table provided by the Economic Policy Research Center (EPRC) in Georgia. General national
accounts data for 2005.
Germany 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Ghana 2005 SAM for Ghana, published in October 2007, by Ghana Statistical Services (GSS), International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) under the Ghana Strategy Support Program (GSSP)
Greece 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Guatemala 2001 Guatemalas Secretaria General de Planificacion (SEGEPLAN).
Honduras 2004 Honduras 2004 SAM
Hong Kong 1988 Tormey (1993)
Hungary 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
India 2003 Input-output transactions table, 2003-04, (Government of India, 2008)
Indonesia 2004 Biro Pusat Statistik (1999)
Iran 2001 Statistical Center of Iran
Ireland 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Israel 2004 Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, the Central Bank of Israel, and the Israeli Tax Authority (ITA), and
others.
Italy 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Japan 2000 Statistics Bureau, the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications (2004)
Kazakhstan 2004 Abdiev (2007)
Kenya 2001 National accounts, and 1997 SAM constructed by the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Anal-
ysis KIPPRA
Kuwait 2005 Kuwait Central Statistics Office, and others
Kyrgyzstan 2003 Miles Light
Laos 2002 Asian Development Bank (2005), Menon and Warr (2006), and Rao (1993)
Latvia 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Lithuania 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Luxembourg 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Madagascar 1999 INSTAT (2003), also documented in Dorosh, P., S. Haggblade, C. Lungren, T. Razafimanantena, and Z.
Randriamiarana (2003)
Malawi 1994 MERRISA/Wobst
Malaysia 2005 Malaysian Input-output tables for the year 2005, Department of Statistics, 2009.
Malta 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Mauritius 1997 Supply and Use Table (SUT) 1997 compiled by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) of Mauritius and others
Mexico 2003 Mexican Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informatica (INEGI)
Mongolia 2005 Mongolian Inter-Sector Balance Table for 2005
Morocco 2004 Bussolo and Roland-Holst (1993)
Mozambique 1995 MERRISA/Arndt et al.
Namibia 2004 Marie-Lange, G. (2008)
Nepal 2007 Input-output technology matrix of year 2001 from the Planning Commission of Nepal, and other sources
Netherlands 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
New Zealand 1996 Statistics New Zealand (1996)
Nicaragua 2000 Central Bank of Nicaragua (2006)
Nigeria 1999 Official 1990 Input-Output Table (30 sector), and an un-official 1999 Input-Output Table (18 sector) sup-
pliedby the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
Norway 2007 Statistics Norway
Oman 2005 National Accounts 2005, Ministry of National Economy, Oman, and others.
Pakistan 2001/02 Labour Force Survey and Nepal Living Standard Survey by CBS Dorosh, Niazi and Nazli (2008)
Panama 1996 SAM built by Marco V. Sanchez and Rob Vos based on Supply and Use Tables "Contralorï¿œa General of
Panamaï¿œ
Paraguay 1994 Central Bank of Paraguay (2006)
Peru 2004 Peruvian Ministry of Finance (2004)
Philippines 2000 Input-Output Table of the Philippines (National Statistical and Coordination board)
Poland 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Portugal 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Qatar 2005 Annual Statistical Abstract, 2007, Qatar Statistics Authority, and others
Romania 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Russia 2003 Rosstat (2008) and (2006)
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Country Year Source
Saudi Arabia 2005 National Accounts Data 2005, Central Department of Statistics and Information, Saudi Ministry of Economy
and Planning; The National Accounts Statistics 2005, also the 2005 Kuwait I/O table
Senegal 1996 1996 SAM prepared by Dr Mamadou Dansokho and Amadou Diouf in 1999 for the Senegal government.
Singapore 1996 Department of Statistics, Singapore (1995).
Slovakia 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Slovenia 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
South Africa 2005 Statistics South Africa (2006)
South Korea 2003 The Bank of Korea (2007)
Spain 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Sri Lanka 2000 Amarasinghe and Bandara (2005), and Bandara and Kelegama (2008)
Sweden 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Switzerland 2008 Swiss Input-Output Table 2008 (Swiss Federal Office of Statistics)
Taiwan 1999 Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) (2001)
Tanzania 1992 MERRISA/Wobst
Thailand 2005 Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB)
Tunisia 1995 Institut National de la Statistique, Tunisia (1998)
Turkey 1998 was also used (e.g. refining capacity, crude oil production, etc.). State Institute of statistics (2004) National
Accounts Data, 2005, UAE
Uganda 2002 Uganda SAM 2002, provided by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBoS), Kampala, Uganda
Ukraine 2004 Ukrainian Input-Output table, State Statistics Committee of Ukraine
United Arab Emirates 2005 Ministry of Economy. Ten-Sector Input- Output Table for the UAE, 2003. SAM of the UAE Economy, 2006,
and others
United Kingdom 2000 Mueller, M., Pï¿œrez Domï¿œnguez, I., & Gay, S. H. (2009)
Uruguay 1997 Terra, Olivieri, Tellechea and Zaclicever (2008)
USA 2002 Dixon and Rimmer (2001), Dixon, Rimmer, and Tsigas (2004), and Lawson (1997)
Venezuela 1997 Department of Macroeconomic Accounts, Central Bank of Venezuela
Viet Nam 2005 Vietnam General Statistics Office (GSO)
Zambia 1995 MERRISA/Hausner
Zimbabwe 1991 MERISSA/Thomas and Bautista
Source: Global Trade Analysis Project (Narayanan et al., 2012)
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Proposition 5 Let
θt+1 = qγt+1θt + 1, t = 1, 2, . . . (52)
where q < 1 and γt+1 satisfies
logγt+1 ∼ N
(
0,σ2
)
, σ > 0
and is i.i.d. across time t. Then there exist an ergodic distribution θ for {θt}t
and k+,k− ∈ R, at least one of them positive, such that
xζP(θ > x)→ k+, xζP(θ < x)→ k−
where ζ = −2 logq/σ2.
Proof 4 It is straightforward to verify that
E
(
(qγ)ζ)
)
= 1.
Hence, the conditions for applying Theorem 1 in Gabaix (2009) are fulfilled
and θ has power law tails with slope parameter ζ.
Proposition 6 If φ = 1, then aggregate output Y satisfies
Y =
(∫
θ
1
1−ρ
i di
)1−ρ
KαρLρ(1−α).
Proof 5 If there are no credit frictions, demand for capital is given by the
firm’s first-order condition
αρθiK
αρ−1
i L
(1−α)ρ
i = R
which, together with the one for labor, implies
w
R
α
1−α
=
Ki
Li
(53)
and on the aggregate, with K ≡ ∫Kidi and L ≡ ∫ Lidi,
w
R
α
1−α
=
K
L
.
Aggregate output is then
Y =
∫
Yidi =
∫
w
ρ (1−α)
Lidi =
(∫
θ
1
1−ρ(1−α)
i
(
Ki
K
) αρ
1−ρ(1−α)
di
)1−ρ(1−α)
Kαρ (Ls)ρ(1−α) .
(54)
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Plugging (53) into (54) yields
Y =
(∫
θ
1
1−ρ(1−α)
i (Ki)
αρ
1−ρ(1−α) di
)1−ρ(1−α)
Lρ(1−α)
=
∫ θ 11−ρ(1−α)+ 11−ρ αρ1−ρ(1−α)i (αρR ) 11−ρ
αρ
1−ρ(1−α)
(
R
w
1−α
α
) (1−α)ρ
1−ρ
αρ
1−ρ(1−α)
di
1−ρ(1−α) Lρ(1−α)
=
(∫
θ
1
1−ρ
i di
)1−ρ(1−α)
(αρ)
αρ
1−ρ
(
1−α
α
R
w
) (1−α)ραρ
1−ρ
R
αρ
ρ−1Lρ(1−α)
=
(∫
θ
1
1−ρ
i di
)1−ρ(1−α)
(αρ)
αρ
1−ρ
(
1
K
) (1−α)ραρ
1−ρ
R
αρ
ρ−1Lρ(1−α)
1−ρ(1−α)
1−ρ
and hence
Y =
(∫
θ
1
1−ρ
i di
)1−ρ
KαρLρ(1−α)
=
(
1
L
∫
θ
1
1−ρ
i di
)1−ρ
KαρL1−αρ.
C
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Table 25: Comparison of Multi-Category Firms in GKPT and ASI
Share of Firms Share of Output Mean Categories
Type of Firm Our Sample GKPT Our Sample GKPT Our Sample GKPT
Single Product 0.61 0.53 0.30 0.20 1.00 1.00
Multiple Product 0.39 0.47 0.70 0.80 2.81 3.06
Multiple Industry 0.22 0.33 0.62 0.62 2.55 2.01
Multiple Sector 0.19 0.24 0.49 0.54 2.34 1.68
Note: ‘Mean categories’ refers to the average number of products, industries,
or sectors in the respective subsample. Moreover, ‘product’ refers to 4-digit
products, ‘industry’ refers to 3-digit industries, and ‘sector’ refers to two-
digit sectors.
Table 26: Summary Statistics for the Variables in Product Turnover
Regressions
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Product addition dummy 18254069 0.00046 0.02136 0 1
Product drop dummy 18254069 0.00045 0.02122 0 1
Input Similarity Index 18254069 0.08349 0.19536 0 1
Downstream Linkages 18254069 0.03192 0.10362 0 0.97
Upstream Linkages 18254069 0.01966 0.09201 0 0.97
Note: Table refers to the joint sample (all observations that are
present for all variables). Product add and drop dummies refer to
additions (droppings) without simultaneous droppings (additions)
by the same firm in the same year.
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Table 27: Fraction of net sales growth due to within-
product/industry growth
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit 4-digit 5-digit
2003 0.93 0.89 0.91 0.81 0.78
2004 0.97 0.97 0.83 0.65 0.63
2005 1.02 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.77
2006 0.98 1.00 0.93 0.77 0.69
2007 0.88 0.81 0.74 0.58 0.56
2008 0.99 0.89 0.72 0.60 0.46
average 0.96 0.92 0.85 0.72 0.65
Notes: This table shows how much of the net sales growth is within product-
s/industries. Some details on the construction: (1) we only look at firm-year
observations in subsequent years (i.e. if there is a gap, then we don’t take
these observations into account. (2) we calculate the net sales growth of
firms in subsequent years (3) the table then shows the net growth within
x-digit products as a fraction of total net growth in (2). Hence, a fraction of
1 would mean that switching of products/industries did not contribute any-
thing to net growth (but could still be large). A fraction of greater than one
would mean that product switching led on average to lower sales values.
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